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HANDLING AGGRAVATING FACTS AFTER 
BLAKELY: FINDINGS FROM FIVE PRESUMPTIVE-
GUIDELINES STATES* 
NANCY J. KING** 
This Article reveals how five states with presumptive (binding) sentencing 
guidelines have implemented the right announced in Blakely v. Washington 
to a jury finding of aggravating facts allowing upward departures from the 
presumptive range. Using data provided by the sentencing commissions and 
courts in Kansas, Minnesota, North Carolina, Oregon, and Washington, as well 
as information from more than 2,200 docket sheets, the study discloses how 
upward departures are used in plea bargaining, sometimes undercutting policy 
goals; how often aggravating facts are tried and by whom; common types of 
aggravating facts; and the remarkably different, sometimes controversial 
interpretations of Blakely and Alleyne v. United States that frame each 
state’s practice. This new information is essential for any evaluation of 
presumptive–sentencing guidelines systems or the appropriate scope of the 
doctrine established in Apprendi v. New Jersey. 
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INTRODUCTION 
We could be entering a renaissance for presumptive sentencing guidelines. 
The American Law Institute recently approved the new Model Penal Code: 
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Sentencing (“MPCS”) with presumptive sentencing guidelines at its heart.1 
Alabama adopted presumptive sentencing guidelines for property offenses in 
2013,2 and Nevada is considering whether they may help to reduce incarceration 
rates and racial disparities.3 Some sentencing scholars continue to praise them 
as a state’s best hope for achieving sentencing goals.4 
This Article reports new empirical information about one important aspect 
of states’ experiences with presumptive sentencing guidelines: how they have 
implemented the right announced in Blakely v. Washington5 to a jury finding 
beyond a reasonable doubt of any aggravating fact allowing an upward 
departure from the presumptive-sentence range.6 Using data provided by the 
sentencing commissions and courts in Kansas, Minnesota, North Carolina, 
Oregon, and Washington, this Article reveals how upward departures are used 
in plea bargaining; how often aggravating facts are tried and by whom; common 
types of aggravating facts; and the remarkably different, sometimes 
controversial interpretations of Blakely that frame each state’s practice. 
These new findings will inform ongoing debates about the appropriate 
scope of the Apprendi v. New Jersey7 line of cases and the merits of presumptive 
sentencing guidelines. Sentencing scholars tend to have strong views on these 
issues. Some may resent Blakely as a procedural tax, in their view perversely 
burdening only the best sentencing systems, while leaving seriously flawed 
 
 1. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE: SENT’G § 1.02(2) cmt. j (AM. L. INST., forthcoming 2021) 
(on file with author) (“Presumptive guidelines, if they are the product of reasoned consideration by 
the commission, go a substantial way toward establishing uniformity of analysis as envisioned in the 
Code.”).  
 2. See ALA. SENTENCING COMM’N, PRESUMPTIVE AND VOLUNTARY SENTENCING 
STANDARDS: MANUAL 15–16 (2016), http://sentencingcommission.alacourt.gov/media/1065/2016-
presumptive-manual.pdf [https://perma.cc/SA8Q-HAZC]; see also Griffin Edwards, Stephen Rushin 
& Joseph Colquitt, The Effects of Voluntary and Presumptive Sentencing Guidelines, 98 TEX. L. REV. 1, 24 
(2019). 
 3. See, e.g., NEV. SENT’G COMM’N, FINAL REPORT 2, 6 (2019) (listing the Nevada Sentencing 
Commission’s duties, including to “[e]valuate whether sentencing guidelines recommended pursuant 
to subsection 8 should be mandatory”). 
 4. See, e.g., RICHARD S. FRASE, JUST SENTENCING: PRINCIPLES AND PROCEDURES FOR A 
WORKABLE SYSTEM 44–45, 203–04 (2013) [hereinafter FRASE, JUST SENTENCING] (discussing the 
advantages of presumptive sentencing guidelines such as decreased risk of sentencing disparity between 
defendants and lowered probability of defendants receiving a level of punishment disproportionate to 
their culpability); MICHAEL O’HEAR, THE FAILED PROMISE OF SENTENCING REFORM 5 (2017) 
(discussing the link between presumptive sentencing guidelines and reduced growth in incarceration 
rates). 
 5. 542 U.S. 296 (2004). 
 6. Id. at 303–05. In Washington, departures are called “exceptional sentences.” WASH. STATE 
CASELOAD FORECAST COUNCIL, 2018 WASHINGTON STATE ADULT SENTENCING MANUAL 64 
(2018) [hereinafter WASH. 2018 MANUAL]. In North Carolina, the term is “aggravated sentence.” See, 
e.g., State v. Hurt, 361 N.C. 325, 326, 643 S.E.2d 915, 916 (2007). In Minnesota, it is “aggravated 
departure.” See, e.g., State v. Barker, 705 N.W.2d 768, 776 (Minn. 2005). I will use “upward departure” 
to refer to all of these higher-than-presumptive-range sentences. 
 7. 530 U.S. 466 (2000). 
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systems untouched.8 Others may admire Blakely as an essential safeguard 
against the erosion of procedural protections in the Bill of Rights.9 This Article 
is full of new ammunition for both sides in such debates, including two novel 
analyses—one testing the claim that presumptive sentencing guidelines 
relinquish less sentencing power to the prosecutor than other fact-based 
sentencing enhancements and the other cataloguing the potential procedural 
advantages states enjoy by treating aggravating facts as something less than full 
offense elements. 
One finding reported here that may encourage those interested in 
presumptive sentencing guidelines involves a concern that led some 
presumptive-guidelines states to shift to advisory guidelines after Blakely was 
decided fifteen years ago: the prospect of costly and cumbersome bifurcated 
jury trials for aggravating factors.10 This specter may well have deterred new 
adoption of presumptive sentencing guidelines and may continue to haunt 
adoption efforts today. But as Part III reports, aggravated factors are rarely 
tried for predictable as well as surprising reasons. More concerning for fans of 
presumptive sentencing guidelines is the uncertain future of some of the 
assumptions that have allowed these five states to limit their Blakely burden. 
The Supreme Court has continued to expand its rule from Apprendi, which 
requires that certain aggravating facts a legislature intends the judge to find at 
sentencing instead carry a right to proof beyond a reasonable doubt as 
determined by a jury.11 These expansions may threaten narrow interpretations 
of Blakely by state courts, including holdings that exempt some upward 
departures from jury consideration or that decline to treat aggravating facts as 
elements for purposes of notice, waiver, double jeopardy, or due process.12 
Another important contribution is this Article’s original analysis of how 
parties use upward-departure sentences in plea bargaining. Bargaining 
inevitably circumvents any effort to structure sentencing discretion. Comparing 
the use of upward-departure sentences with other fact-based, range-raising 
devices such as mandatory minimum sentences, I find similar patterns as well 
as important differences. 
 
 8. Kevin R. Reitz, The New Sentencing Conundrum: Policy and Constitutional Law at Cross-Purposes, 
105 COLUM. L. REV. 1082, 1101, 1106 (2005) (examining the concerns of Professor Richard Frase that 
Blakely “tends to attack the most desirable systems while giving a constitutional free pass to many of 
the worst”); Blakely, 542 U.S. at 314, 318 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (objecting that the Blakely rule will 
“either trim or eliminate altogether their sentencing guidelines schemes and, with them, 20 years of 
sentencing reform” and that it imposes a “substantial constitutional tax”). 
 9. E.g., United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 244 (2005) (recognizing that the Blakely rule 
advances “the interest in fairness and reliability protected by the right to a jury trial—a common-law 
right that defendants enjoyed for centuries and that is now enshrined in the Sixth Amendment”).  
 10. See infra note 18.  
 11. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490; see, e.g., State v. Gould, 23 P.3d 801, 814 (Kan. 2001). 
 12. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 58–65, 78–79, 179–82, 195, 217–25.  
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Following an introduction to presumptive sentencing guidelines, the 
Blakely rule, and a short explanation of the data on which this study is based, 
Part II addresses the volume of upward-departure sentences in the five 
presumptive-guidelines states, as well as legal and policy choices that help 
define that volume. Part III examines how upward-departure sentences are used 
in plea bargaining, including examples of how parties manipulate these upward 
departures to reach results inconsistent with sentencing policy, and barriers to 
judicial control. Part IV reports detailed information about the adjudication of 
aggravating factors in contested cases. Specifically, it examines: (1) the low 
percentage of cases in which formal notice is docketed in advance of conviction, 
(2) the use of bifurcated jury proceedings, (3) the rate of stipulation to 
aggravated facts after conviction at trial, and (4) the many ways that state 
procedure for adjudicating these factors differs from the Supreme Court’s 
characterization of aggravating facts as elements of the offense. 
I. SUMMARY OF PRESUMPTIVE SENTENCING GUIDELINES, THE BLAKELY 
RULE, AND STUDY DATA 
A. Presumptive Sentencing Guidelines in the States 
Sentencing guidelines regulate a judge’s sentencing discretion. Under a 
presumptive-guidelines system, the entire statutory range of punishment for a 
given offense is not available to the judge upon conviction.13 Instead, 
presumptive sentencing guidelines designate a narrower range as the 
presumptive sentence, appropriate for a typical violation. Sentence options 
above or below the presumptive range are available only after a finding of one 
or more aggravating or mitigating circumstances. Without these requisite 
findings, sentences outside of the presumptive range can be overturned on 
appeal; hence, some alternatively label presumptive sentencing guidelines as 
“binding”14 or “mandatory” guidelines.15 
When initially adopted in the 1980s and 1990s, presumptive-guidelines 
systems allowed judges to determine, by a preponderance of proof, aggravating 
 
 13. E.g., WAYNE R. LAFAVE, JEROLD H. ISRAEL, NANCY J. KING & ORIN S. KERR, 6 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 26.3(e) (4th ed. 2015), Westlaw (database updated Dec. 2020).  
 14. Richard S. Frase, Forty Years of American Sentencing Guidelines: What Have We Learned?, 48 
CRIME & JUST. 79, 99 (2019) [hereinafter Frase, Forty Years] (terming these presumptive-guidelines 
systems “binding systems with active appellate review”). 
 15. See, e.g., United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005). Appellate oversight varies in 
degree. See Richard S. Frase, Varying Binding Effects of Guidelines -- the Mandatory-to-Advisory 
Continuum, UNIV. MINN.: SENT’G GUIDELINES RES. CTR. (Mar. 25, 2015), https://sentencing.umn 
.edu/content/varying-binding-effects-guidelines-mandatory-advisory-continuum [https://perma.cc/ 
W3NY-MPFK]. 
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facts required for sentencing above the presumptive range at sentencing.16 But 
in 2004, the Supreme Court in Blakely applied Apprendi to hold that when 
judicial adherence to a presumptive punishment range is enforceable through 
appeal, any fact (other than prior conviction) required to exceed that range must 
be proven beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury or admitted by the defendant.17 
Although Kansas anticipated Blakely’s rule as an inevitable consequence of the 
Court’s decision in Apprendi, Blakely surprised almost everyone else. Suddenly 
the Constitution required jury trials for facts that for years had been adjudicated 
less formally at sentencing. The prospect of complying with Blakely and proving 
aggravating facts beyond a reasonable doubt to juries prompted some states to 
abandon appellate enforcement of presumptive ranges, rendering their 
presumptive sentencing guidelines “advisory.”18 
The five states examined in this Article kept their presumptive sentencing 
guidelines, despite Blakely. Each state determines the presumptive-sentencing 
range for a defendant by cross referencing the defendant’s criminal history with 
the severity level for the crime of conviction.19 Often, presumptive ranges 
specify a type of sentence (such as probation, jail, or prison) as well as the 
presumptive duration of sentence for each case.20 A sentence that is more severe 
than a sentence within the presumptive range is an upward departure—either a 
more punitive type of sentence—(an “upward dispositional departure”), or a 
 
 16. See, e.g., Richard S. Frase, Sentencing Guidelines in Minnesota, Other States, and the Federal 
Courts: A Twenty-Year Retrospective, 12 FED. SENT’G REP. 69, 70–72 (1999); Don Stemen & Daniel F. 
Wilhelm, Finding the Jury: State Legislative Responses to Blakely v. Washington, 18 FED. SENT’G REP. 7, 
7 (2005). 
 17. See Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 303–05 (2004). 
 18. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE: SENT’G § 10.07 reporters’ note k (AM. L. INST., forthcoming 
2021) (on file with author); Stemen & Wilhelm, supra note 16, at 9–10 (explaining that in Tennessee, 
“[t]he Governor’s Task Force on the Use of Enhancement Factors in Criminal Sentencing . . . proposed 
the switch to a voluntary system . . . [and] noted that jury fact-finding could ‘increase service time of 
jurors, increase jury trial time on the court docket, impose increased burdens on public defenders and 
district attorneys and otherwise increase the costs of the administration of justice’” (quoting 
GOVERNOR’S TASK FORCE ON THE USE OF ENHANCEMENT FACTORS IN CRIM. SENT’G, REPORT 
OF THE GOVERNOR’S TASK FORCE ON THE USE OF ENHANCEMENT FACTORS IN CRIMINAL 
SENTENCING 3 (2005))); see also Edwards et al., supra note 2, at 17 (collecting judicial and academic 
views that states’ “attempts to maintain sentencing guidelines while complying with Blakely would 
prove unnecessarily burdensome and taxing to implement”).  
 19. These states use a grid with criminal history on one axis and severity level for the offense of 
conviction on the other. Kelly Lyn Mitchell, State Sentencing Guidelines: A Garden Full of Variety, FED. 
PROB., Sept. 2017, at 28, 28–29. Some states have separate grids for sex or drug offenses. For an 
excellent collection of information and law for every state using sentencing guidelines, see Sentencing 
Guidelines Resource Center, ROBINA INST. CRIM. L. & CRIM. JUST., https://sentencing.umn.edu/ 
[https://perma.cc/W3RU-YDJR]. 
 20. None set presumptive ranges for fines or other economic sanctions, although the MPCS 
recommends that these be included. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENT’G § 9.04(3)(b) (AM. L. INST., 
forthcoming 2021) (on file with author). If they were included, upward departures above the 
presumptive ranges for financial sanctions would trigger Apprendi’s rule as affirmed by Blakely. See S. 
Union Co. v. United States, 567 U.S. 343, 348–51, 359–61 (2012). 
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longer term (an “upward durational departure”).21 In each state, proof of a single 
aggravating fact gives the judge the option of exceeding the presumptive 
range.22 
B. Why Study the Adjudication of Aggravating Facts? 
Proponents of presumptive sentencing guidelines assert that concerns 
about the burdens of proving aggravating facts beyond a reasonable doubt to a 
jury are “unfounded”23 and that the cost of adjudicating these facts is “small and 
manageable.”24 Yet, other than annual reports from these states showing that 
only a very small percentage of felony sentences involve upward departures, no 
research has attempted to examine this particular claim. For example, there has 
been no effort to determine how aggravating facts are used in bargaining, how 
many defendants admit aggravating facts after conviction, how many trials are 
bifurcated, or how often defendants opt for a bench trial on the aggravating fact 
 
 21. The use of dispositional departures varies by state. See infra text accompanying notes 56–57. 
 22. See KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-6815 to -6818 (Westlaw through laws enacted during the 2021 
Reg. Sess. of the Kan. Leg. effective on Apr. 1, 2021); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.16 (LEXIS 
through Sess. Laws 2021-6 of the 2021 Reg. Sess. of the Gen. Assemb.); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 136.785 (Westlaw through laws enacted in the 2020 Reg. Sess. of the 80th Legis. Assemb.); WASH. 
REV. CODE ANN. §§ 9.94A.535, 9.94A.537 (LEXIS through chapter 9 of the 2021 Reg. Sess.); State 
v. Vance, 765 N.W.2d 390, 394 (Minn. 2009). 
This is one of many features that makes these systems simpler than the excessively complex U.S. 
Sentencing Guidelines. Instead of one presumptive range per offense varying only with criminal 
history, as in these states’ presumptive-guidelines systems, the federal guidelines provide dozens of 
possible ranges for a given offense for a given defendant. Which one applies depends on a score derived 
by adding and subtracting points for a very long list of often contestable aggravating and mitigating 
facts, including “relevant conduct.” Departure requirements are layered on top of all that. See, e.g., 
United States v. Perez-Silvan, 861 F.3d 935, 944 (9th Cir. 2017) (Owens, J., concurring) (urging the 
U.S. Sentencing Commission to “simplify the Guidelines to avoid the frequent sentencing adventures 
more complicated than reconstructing the Staff of Ra in the Map Room to locate the Well of the 
Souls”); Richard B. Ruback & Jonathan Wroblewski, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Psychological and 
Policy Reasons for Simplification, 7 PSYCH. PUB. POL’Y & L. 739, 749–53 (2001) (discussing the 
complexity and perceived flaws in the structure of the federal guidelines); Kate Stith, Principles, 
Pragmatism, and Politics: The Evolution of Washington State’s Sentencing Guidelines, 76 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 105, 105–07 (2013) (explaining that Washington’s presumptive sentencing guidelines are less 
complex than the federal guidelines). 
In some states, an additional showing is required for departure sentences that exceed twice the 
presumptive range. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-6818(b)–(c) (Westlaw); State v. Jackson, 749 N.W.2d 353, 
359 (Minn. 2008); Neal v. State, 658 N.W.2d 536, 544 (Minn. 2003); State v. Spain, 590 N.W.2d 85, 
89 (Minn. 1999); OR. ADMIN. R. 213-008-0003(2), 213-008-0005(3) (Westlaw through rules filed 
through Mar. 23, 2021). In North Carolina, the judge imposes an aggravated minimum sentence, and 
the maximum becomes 120% of that plus a period of supervised release. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-
1340.17 (LEXIS through Sess. Laws 2021-6 of the 2021 Reg. Sess. of the Gen. Assemb.). 
 23. See, e.g., FRASE, JUST SENTENCING, supra note 4, at 47 (calling concerns about “problems in 
complying with the requirements of Blakely” unfounded). 
 24. See MODEL PENAL CODE: SENT’G § 10.07 reporters’ note a (AM. L. INST., forthcoming 
2021) (on file with author). 
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rather than a jury trial. Nor has there been any effort to determine the reasons 
why some states have higher upward-departure rates than others. 
In addition to addressing these issues, this Article also sheds new light on 
the purported advantages of relying upon presumptive sentencing guidelines 
over other methods of calibrating sentences using factual findings beyond those 
inherent in a conviction. Probably the most traditional alternative method has 
been for the legislature to enact a separate, aggravated version of a core offense, 
tacking on an aggravating fact to create a greater offense, such as robbery and 
armed robbery. Such “nested” or “graded” offenses exist in every type of 
sentencing system, indeterminate and determinate, guidelines or no guidelines. 
So do mandatory minimum sentences and other sentence enhancements, which 
became popular in the second half of the twentieth century.25 Mandatory 
minimum statutes raise the floor of the available sentence range for an offense 
whenever a designated fact is determined; sentence-enhancement statutes 
either mandate or permit a more severe sentence once the designated fact is 
determined.26 
The Court’s Apprendi doctrine does not distinguish between these 
alternative ways of keying punishment ranges to factfinding. Apprendi 
guarantees to the defendant the right to a unanimous jury determination, 
beyond a reasonable doubt, of any fact (other than the fact of a previous 
conviction) that raises the minimum or maximum penalty beyond what was 
authorized by the conviction alone.27 In the Court’s view, that range-raising fact 
is an element, like any other element.28 Because they all should trigger the same 
 
 25. See generally Erik Luna, Mandatory Minimums, in 4 REFORMING CRIMINAL JUSTICE: 
PUNISHMENT, INCARCERATION, AND RELEASE 117, 117–24 (Erik Luna ed., 2017), 
https://law.asu.edu/sites/default/files/pdf/academy_for_justice/7_Criminal_Justice_Reform_Vol_4_
Mandatory-Minimums.pdf [https://perma.cc/VTK8-5Q84]; DALE PARENT, TERENCE DUNWORTH, 
DOUGLAS MCDONALD & WILLIAM RHODES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., KEY LEGISLATIVE ISSUES IN 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE: MANDATORY SENTENCING 1 (1997), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/161839.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5FRL-MY33]; see also infra note 40 and accompanying text.  
 26. Luna, supra note 25, at 117, 119; PARENT ET AL., supra note 25, at 1. 
 27. See Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99, 111–12 (2013). 
 28. See, e.g., id. (“Apprendi concluded that any ‘facts that increase the prescribed range of penalties 
to which a criminal defendant is exposed’ are elements of the crime . . . . (‘[F]acts that expose a 
defendant to a punishment greater than that otherwise legally prescribed were by definition “elements” 
of a separate legal offense.’)” (quoting Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000))); Ring v. 
Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002) (stating the “aggravating factors” that render a defendant eligible 
for capital punishment in Arizona “operate as ‘the functional equivalent of an element of a greater 
offense’” (quoting Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 494 n.19 (2000))); see also Burrage v. United 
States, 571 U.S. 204, 210 (2014) (“Because the ‘death results’ enhancement increased the minimum and 
maximum sentences to which Burrage was exposed, it is an element that must be submitted to the jury 
and found beyond a reasonable doubt . . . . Thus, the crime charged in count 2 of Burrage’s superseding 
indictment has two principal elements: (i) knowing or intentional distribution of heroin, § 841(a)(1), 
and (ii) death caused by (‘resulting from’) the use of that drug, § 841(b)(1)(C).” (first quoting Alleyne, 
570 U.S. at 115–16; and then quoting Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000))); United 
States v. Haymond, 139 S. Ct. 2369, 2395 (2019) (Alito, J., dissenting) (distinguishing the situation in 
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constitutional protections, any of the alternative range-raising devices should 
impose similar procedural costs. Yet advocates of presumptive sentencing 
guidelines have argued that presumptive guidelines are a superior option 
because they enforce judicial adherence to fact-based calibration while 
relinquishing less sentencing power to the prosecutor.29 As noted earlier, this 
Article is the first to address the merits of this claim in states with presumptive 
sentencing guidelines. It also reveals the potential procedural advantages these 
states enjoy by withholding protections for the adjudication of aggravating facts 
that are normally afforded other elements of the offense. 
Lastly, information about how judges and prosecutors use upward 
departures in these presumptive-guidelines states can inform ongoing research 
evaluating the impact of presumptive sentencing guidelines. Quantitative 
research about presumptive sentencing guidelines has focused, understandably, 
on whether they exacerbate or mitigate incarceration growth and racial 
inequities, compared to other sentencing systems. This is important and 
promising research, but no consensus on these points has emerged.30 Knowing 
 
United States v. Haymond, 139 S. Ct. 2369 (2019), from the Court’s Apprendi line of cases, where the 
Court “rejected what it saw as attempts to place the label ‘sentencing enhancement’ on what, in its 
view, were essentially elements of charged offenses”). 
 29. See infra notes 149–68 and accompanying text.  
 30. On impacting incarceration rates, see, for example, MODEL PENAL CODE: SENT’G app. B at 
916 (AM. L. INST., forthcoming 2021) (on file with author); NAT’L RSCH. COUNCIL, THE GROWTH 
OF INCARCERATION IN THE UNITED STATES: EXPLORING CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 76–78 
(Jeremy Travis, Bruce Western & Steve Redburn eds., 2014) [hereinafter NAT’L RSCH. COUNCIL, 
THE GROWTH OF INCARCERATION]; Richard S. Frase, Can Sentencing Guidelines Commissions Help 
States Substantially Reduce Mass Incarceration?, 104 MINN. L. REV. 2781, 2796–97 (2020) (noting that 
data comparing systems is “inconclusive” on whether presumptive sentencing guidelines are better at 
reducing incarceration); John F. Pfaff, The Continued Vitality of Structured Sentencing Following Blakely: 
The Effectiveness of Voluntary Guidelines, 54 UCLA L. REV. 235, 261–65 (2006) (providing statistics and 
noting that presumptive sentencing guidelines appear to be more effective than voluntary guidelines 
at reducing the variation in sentences between defendants); Kevin R. Reitz, Prison-Release Reform and 
American Decarceration, 104 MINN. L. REV. 2741, 2745, 2769–79 (2020). 
On racial disparities, see Edwards et al., supra note 2, at 19–20 nn.107–13, 32 (collecting 
research that was inconclusive regarding whether making federal guidelines advisory increased 
racial disparity and also finding that “the introduction of sentencing guidelines in Alabama 
contributed to reductions in sentence length, reductions in racial disparities in sentences for similar 
offenses, and reductions in interjudge disparities in sentence lengths”); RICHARD S. FRASE & JULIAN 
V. ROBERTS, PAYING FOR THE PAST: THE CASE AGAINST PRIOR RECORD SENTENCE 
ENHANCEMENTS 128–48 (2019); WASH. SENT’G GUIDELINES COMM’N, REVIEW OF THE 
SENTENCING REFORM ACT 8–9 (2019) [hereinafter WASH. COMM’N, 2019 REVIEW], 
https://sentencing.umn.edu/sites/sentencing.umn.edu/files/washington_review_of_the_sentencing_re
form_act_2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/36N9-EVCG] (“[S]ystems where judges have the greatest 
discretion, where they are not required to abide by the guidelines, do not have an increase in racial 
disparity over those that are more restrictive.”); MODEL PENAL CODE: SENT’G § 1.02(2) cmt. k, 
reporters’ note k (AM. L. INST., forthcoming 2021) (on file with author) (collecting research and 
claiming it “suggests that presumptive sentencing guidelines systems and determinate (non-paroling) 
systems have produced lower levels of racial and ethnic disparities compared with advisory guidelines 
systems, nonguidelines systems, and indeterminate systems”). 
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more about how these presumptive sentencing guidelines are applied by the 
lawyers and judges who use them can help inform why presumptive sentencing 
guidelines may or may not impact incarceration rates, racial disparities, rates of 
recidivism and crime, and perceived legitimacy.31 
C. Summary of Data for Study 
For this study, all five presumptive-guidelines states provided information 
about adult felony cases where the sentence included an upward departure from 
the presumptive range.32 Detail varied considerably but included the type of 
offense, year of conviction, sentence or commitment, type of sentence (for 
example, probation or incarceration), and whether the conviction was by plea 
or trial. Analysis of Oregon’s data was limited to the years 2016 and 2017 
because departure data was not collected until 2015. The other states’ data 
covered eight years of sentencing, 2010–2017.  
Using case numbers in data sets from Kansas, Minnesota, and Oregon, my 
research assistants and I were able to obtain and examine trial court registers or 
 
Simple comparisons of the presumptive-guidelines states with other states are suggestive, but the 
effects of supervision, revocation, good-time credit, and release practices and policies may dwarf the 
effects of the type of guidelines system a state follows. See, e.g., Reitz, supra, at 2748 (discussing parole 
release generally and stating, “The cumulative actions of parole boards can generate large swings in a 
state’s prison population while hardly alerting anyone to the source of the change”). Another challenge 
for these analyses is that even if it is possible to control for the constantly changing law and practice 
within and between states, most studies examine sentencing information by crime of conviction alone, 
masking the arrest, charging, and bargaining decisions that produce those sentences. See, e.g., Amy 
Baron-Evans & Kate Stith, Booker Rules, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1631, 1684–85 (2012) (“[M]easuring 
disparity solely with reference to judicial decisionmaking ignores disparities inevitably created by 
differing prosecutorial charging and plea-bargaining policies and strategies across cases and districts.”). 
 31. See, e.g., O’HEAR, supra note 4, at 5 (“[R]estricting judicial discretion in this way does not 
necessarily lead to tougher sentences; it all depends on how exactly the restriction is designed and 
implemented.”). 
 32. None of the data sets I obtained were or are publicly available online. Accordingly, I report 
only aggregate statistics and do not provide complete citations for individual cases. The Kansas 
Sentencing Commission provided data on adult felony sentences imposed for 2010–2017. The 
Washington State Caseload Forecasting Council provided adult sentencing data from Washington for 
the years 2010–2017. The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission provided data on adult 
criminal cases with felony sentences that included an aggravated departure imposed for the years 2010–
2017. The Research and Evaluation Unit of the Minnesota Judicial Branch also provided, for the same 
time period, data on adult felony cases ending in conviction with specified “Blakely” events. See infra 
note 156 and accompanying text. The Oregon Criminal Justice Commission provided data on adult 
sentences imposed in Oregon for the years 2016 and 2017. Felony historical data for North Carolina 
cases—Statistical Report Data for the years 2010–2017—were provided by the North Carolina 
Sentencing and Policy Advisory Commission (“NCSPAC”). My analysis of these data sets took place 
between February and August of 2020. It included date limiting, consolidating multiple annual data 
sets with different variables, consolidating multiple observations for a single case, removing duplicate 
entries, and creating dozens of new variables for analysis. My analysis and any conclusions in this 
Article may not be attributed to, and are not endorsed by, the NCSPAC or any of the other data 
providers listed above. 
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docket sheets for many of the upward-departure cases.33 These docket sheets 
often included information not available in the relevant state sentencing 
commission’s data—such as whether the trial was bifurcated, whether the 
defendant admitted the aggravating fact, or the reason for the upward 
departure.34 
II. THE VOLUME OF UPWARD-DEPARTURE SENTENCES CARRYING A 
RIGHT TO A JURY FINDING BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT 
Before turning to the number of aggravated sentences subject to the 
Blakely rule, consider what factors might determine that number. One factor is 
the extent to which a state allows sentencing outside the presumptive sentencing 
guidelines. The celebrated capacity of presumptive sentencing guidelines to 
achieve sentences with greater consistency, legitimacy, and more effective fiscal 
management35 presupposes a sentencing system designed and amended as a 
whole. But the gradual accretion of mandatory minimum sentences and 
sentencing-enhancement provisions36 removes an ever-increasing portion of 
 
 33. Information from the docket sheets in more than 2,200 cases was collected. From Minnesota, 
I gathered information for the more than 400 cases from 2010 to 2017 that included an upward-
departure sentence and an indication in data from either the Minnesota Judicial Branch or the 
Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission that a bench or jury trial had been held. Using 
Minnesota Judicial Branch data, I also coded the dockets of 332 cases (including all tried cases) in which 
the data indicated that the prosecutor had sought an upward departure but one was not imposed. 
Finally, I coded a nonrandom sample of 186 cases from among guilty plea cases with upward departures 
in Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission data. From Kansas, I collected docket information 
for all 135 cases including an upward durational departure sentence from 2010 to 2017. From Oregon, I 
gathered docket information for 1,132 cases, consisting of all cases from 2016 to 2017 with both an 
upward dispositional and upward durational departure, an upward durational departure only, or an 
upward dispositional and downward durational departure, as well as a 13.2% random sample of the 
1,087 downward dispositional / upward durational departure cases, and a 6.4% random sample of the 
3,064 upward dispositional departure cases. 
For Minnesota and Oregon, I downloaded trial court dockets from each state court’s website. In 
Kansas, dockets from a few counties were publicly available online, and others I purchased. 
 34. For cases that had been appealed, this information was sometimes available in an appellate 
opinion, which I located by searching for the appellate opinion on the public websites in Kansas, 
Minnesota, and Oregon. In Kansas and Minnesota, many of the tried cases with upward durational 
departures had been appealed, but often the appeal challenged the conviction alone and shed no 
additional light on the adjudication of the fact underlying the upward departure. 
 35. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE: SENT’G § 1.02(2)(b) cmts. j, k, l, o (AM. L. INST., 
forthcoming 2021) (on file with author) (explaining the advantages of presumptive sentencing 
guidelines in meeting these ends). 
 36. See, e.g., RACHEL ELISE BARKOW, PRISONERS OF POLITICS: BREAKING THE CYCLE OF 
MASS INCARCERATION 33–36 (2019) [hereinafter BARKOW, PRISONERS OF POLITICS] (discussing 
the history and rise in popularity of mandatory minimum sentences); Russell M. Gold, Prosecutors and 
Their Legislatures, Legislatures and Their Prosecutors, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF PROSECUTORS AND 
PROSECUTION (Ronald Wright, Kay Levine & Russel Gold eds., forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 
546, 555–62) (on file with author) (discussing the development and increasing prevalence of mandatory 
minimums and sentence enhancements); Michael Tonry, Sentencing in America, 1975-2025, in 42 CRIME 
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felony adjudication from sentencing guidelines regulation. The result is that 
every presumptive-guidelines state has some set of cases to which the guidelines 
do not apply. This not only undercuts the ability of presumptive sentencing 
guidelines to meet policy goals,37 but it also affects the amount and type of 
upward departures. A state in which most offenses are sentenced under the 
presumptive sentencing guidelines is likely to have more upward departures 
than a state in which a legislature has opted for alternative ways to increase 
punishment when designated circumstances are present. 
Two other factors may affect the volume of aggravated sentences that carry 
a right to a jury finding: the breadth of a state’s presumptive-sentencing ranges 
and a state’s unique interpretations of the Court’s Apprendi doctrine. The 
sections below examine how each of these three factors may have influenced the 
magnitude of aggravated sentencing subject to the Blakely rule in the five states 
examined in this Article. 
A. Bypassing the Presumptive Sentencing Guidelines 
The MPCS advances a model sentencing scheme that abolishes mandatory 
minimum sentences38 and only rarely exempts offenses from guidelines 
sentencing.39 Legislators are supposed to set broad sentence ranges and then 
keep their hands off, refraining from boosting minimum or maximum sentences 
for specified scenarios beyond the ranges adopted by the state’s sentencing 
commission. The five states using presumptive sentencing guidelines discussed 
in this study fall short of this ideal, to differing degrees. In each, the reach of 
the guidelines has contracted as legislators have expanded the number of 
 
AND JUSTICE IN AMERICA, 1975-2025, at 141, 144–45 (Michael Tonry ed., 2013) (explaining the 
proliferation of mandatory minimums). 
 37. A sentencing commission can slow this trend by warning legislators about such negative 
effects, see Rachel E. Barkow, Administering Crime, 52 UCLA L. REV. 715, 810–11 (2005), but that 
requires that a state’s sentencing commission receive sustained funding for research, independence 
from political pressure, and significant deference from those with the power to undercut its penalty or 
policy choices, see id. at 781–87; see also MODEL PENAL CODE: SENT’G § 8.01 cmts. b–d (AM. L. INST., 
forthcoming 2021) (on file with author) (discussing required attributes of state sentencing 
commissions); BARKOW, PRISONERS OF POLITICS, supra note 36, at 171–77 (discussing various issues 
with existing state sentencing commissions and more advantageous approaches to avoid those problems 
in both state sentencing commissions and criminal justice agencies at large); FRASE, JUST 
SENTENCING, supra note 4, at 42–44 (describing the ideal structure and characteristics of a state 
sentencing commission); Stemen & Wilhelm, supra note 16, at 9–10 (arguing that presumptive-
sentencing systems survived Blakely in states where legislatures fund strong state sentencing 
commissions that were able to provide reports that could explain procedural changes required in 
response). 
 38. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENT’G §§ 1.02(2) cmt. i, 6.02 cmt. c (AM. L. INST., forthcoming 
2021) (on file with author). 
 39. Id. § 9.09(2) (stating that offenses should be excluded from sentencing guidelines only if 
“prosecutions are rarely initiated, if the offense definitions are so broad that presumptive sentences 
cannot reasonably be fashioned, or for other sufficient reasons that inclusion in the guidelines would 
be of marginal utility”). 
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mandatory minimum and special-sentencing statutes that trump the application 
of the guidelines.40 
Kansas dramatically illustrates this phenomenon. Many have pointed to 
Kansas as proof that the number of upward departures subject to the Blakely 
rule in a presumptive-guidelines system can be quite small and manageable.41 
Kansas Sentencing Commission reports suggest that no more than four percent 
of total guidelines sentences—probation and incarceration combined—involve 
any upward departure.42 Yet a close look at sentencing in Kansas suggests that 
 
 40. In Washington, enhancements have grown over the years. WASH. COMM’N, 2019 REVIEW, 
supra note 30, at 20 (noting the increase in the list of offenses to which firearm enhancements could be 
applied, the creation of eleven other enhancements, and the complexity of these enhancements that 
“are, at their core, mandatory minimums”); id. at app. E (displaying a three-page “Sentencing 
Enhancement Reference Guide”); see also WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.94A.540 (LEXIS through 
chapter 9 of the 2021 Reg. Sess.) (providing mandatory minimum terms for certain murders, assaults, 
rapes, and escapes); James Drew, Is Giving Judges More Discretion in Sentencing the Right Reform? 
Lawmakers To Decide, NEWS TRIB., https://www.thenewstribune.com/news/politics-government/ 
article234301847.html [https://perma.cc/8VZ2-FDFU] (Aug. 25, 2019, 9:46 AM) (“Hauge, chairman 
of the Sentencing Guidelines Commission and a former Kitsap County Prosecuting Attorney, said 
there have been several ‘good-faith’ efforts to make the law better, but ‘what we have created is a system 
of almost impenetrable complexity that the Department of Corrections is charged with making sense 
of.’”). 
In North Carolina, drug trafficking crimes and violent habitual offenders are sentenced outside 
the presumptive sentencing guidelines. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-95(h) (LEXIS through Sess. Laws 
2021-6 of the 2021 Reg. Sess. of the Gen. Assemb.) (covering drug trafficking crimes); id. § 14-7.12 
(LEXIS) (covering violent habitual offenders). There are a number of other sentence-enhancement 
provisions raising the presumptive-sentencing range based on a finding of fact, including possession of 
a bulletproof vest, knowing the behavior violates a protective order, and use of a firearm. N.C. SENT’G 
& POL’Y ADVISORY COMM’N, STRUCTURED SENTENCING TRAINING AND REFERENCE MANUAL 
9, 26 (2014) [hereinafter 2014 N.C. STRUCTURED SENTENCING MANUAL] (listing offense class 
enhancement facts). 
In Minnesota, mandatory minimum provisions include terms for felony DWI, MINN. STAT. 
§ 169A.276 (2020), and firearm enhancements, id. § 609.11. Other mandatory sentences are provided 
for sex offender–registration violations, furnishing alcohol to minors, assaults against police officers, 
any gang-related felony, and more. See MINN. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES RSCH. DEP’T, 
MANDATORY SENTENCING LAWS INFORMATION BRIEF 4, 6 (2011); see also MINN. SENT’G 
GUIDELINES COMM’N, MINNESOTA FELONY STATUTORY SENTENCING ENHANCEMENTS: 
HIGHLIGHTS FROM 1987 TO 2017, at 1–6 (2017) (listing the development of different sentencing 
enhancements over a thirty-year period). 
 41. See, e.g., WASH. SENT’G GUIDELINES COMM’N, REPORT OF THE SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES COMMISSION: DISCRETION UNDER THE SENTENCING REFORM ACT AND THE 
IMPACT OF BLAKELY V. WASHINGTON 10 (2005) [hereinafter WASH. SENT’G GUIDELINES COMM’N, 
BLAKELY REPORT] (reporting that a survey of judges, prosecutors and defense attorneys in Kansas 
“‘did not find anyone who believed that the post-Gould statutory changes have had any appreciable 
effect on the operation of the Kansas sentencing process.’” (quoting Reitz, The New Sentencing 
Conundrum, supra note 8, at 1109 n.101)); Stemen & Wilhelm, supra note 16, at 8; MODEL PENAL 
CODE: SENT’G § 10.07 reporters’ note a (AM. L. INST., forthcoming 2021) (on file with author) (noting 
that Kansas’s approach using jury factfinding does not burden their court system). 
 42. See, e.g., KAN. SENT’G COMM’N, ANNUAL REPORT FY 2018: ANALYSIS OF SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES IN KANSAS 64–66 (2019) [hereinafter KAN. 2018 ANNUAL REPORT], https:// 
www.sentencing.ks.gov/docs/default-source/annual-reports/fy2018annualreport.pdf?sfvrsn=5f8bfd3f 
_6 [https://perma.cc/UH45-LFNG] (reporting 85 upward dispositional and 188 upward durational 
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one contributor to this low number is the volume of cases that receive elevated 
sentences under separate sentencing provisions and are not counted as upward 
departures. 
Kansas sentencing law diverts just under half of its prison sentences away 
from its guidelines, meaning those elevated sentences are not reported as 
upward departures from the guidelines. There are two reasons for this. First, as 
in many other presumptive-guidelines states, the most serious crimes in 
Kansas—murder, terrorism, and certain sex offenses—are sentenced under their 
own sentencing statutes rather than the presumptive sentencing guidelines.43 
Analysis of data from 2010 to 2017 provided by the Kansas Sentencing 
Commission shows that these “off-grid” cases accounted for about one percent 
of prison sentences imposed during that period. 
In addition to this one percent of prison sentences diverted from departure 
analysis, a much larger set of felony sentences are not counted in the Kansas 
Sentencing Commission’s reports as upward departures because they are 
imposed under one of the four dozen special-sentencing rules that raise the 
sentence range available to the judge.44 For example, in 2018, an estimated 
forty-five percent of prison sentences were not governed by the Kansas 
guidelines’ departure provisions because of one or more of these special rules.45 
 
departure sentences, of 6,891 total guideline sentences, or 3.96%, which counts cases with both upward 
dispositional and upward durational departures twice).  
 43. See KAN. SENT’G COMM’N, KANSAS SENTENCING GUIDELINES DESK REFERENCE 
MANUAL 2018, at 14–16 (2018) [hereinafter KANSAS 2018 MANUAL] (explaining off-grid crimes).  
 44. KAN. SENT’G COMM’N, ANNUAL REPORT: FY 2019, at xiv–xv (2020); see also Terri Savely, 
25 Years of the Kansas Sentencing Guidelines: Where We Were, Where We Are, and What’s Next?, 86 J. KAN. 
BAR ASS’N 22, 30 (2017) (“The once essentially straightforward grid process has become fractured by 
constant legislative changes and the adoption of numerous special rules.”). All sentences imposed 
because of a special rule are entirely excluded from the Kansas Sentencing Commission’s reported 
upward-departure analysis. See, e.g., KAN. SENT’G COMM’N, ANNUAL REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2017, 
at xiv–xv (2018). 
 45. KAN. 2018 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 42, at 80–81. For diverted sentences from 2014 to 
2017, see id. at 81 (showing, of sentences to prison, 43.5% were sentences with special rules and thus 
not considered upward departures). These figures exclude off-grid sentences as well as sentences that 
run concurrently with or consecutively to a preguideline sentence. See id. at 80.  
Nearly ninety percent of all special-rule cases are sentenced under a rule that allows or mandates 
the imposition of an incarceration sentence despite a presumed sentence of nonincarceration. The three 
most commonly applied special-sentence rules raise the presumed sentence from nonprison to prison. 
One raises the presumed sentence for a “person” felony (a felony triggered by an act or threat of 
physical violence against another person) to imprisonment if a judge finds it was committed with a 
firearm, and the other two allow a sentence of imprisonment, even when the presumed sentence is 
nonprison, if the offense was committed while incarcerated, under supervision, or on felony bond. 
Other special rules tack on an additional term after the trier of fact finds a fact, such as possessing a 
firearm in furtherance of a drug felony (adds six months’ imprisonment) or discharging a firearm while 
committing a drug felony (adds eighteen months). These are essentially aggravated offenses, with the 
fact included as part of the verdict, but are enacted as a sentencing provision. Still other special rules 
are pure prior-conviction enhancements, or operate to permit consecutive sentencing, and thus do not 
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This removal of nearly half of Kansas’s prison sentences from departure analysis 
may explain, at least in part, why the percentage of all felony sentences 
including an upward departure is lower in Kansas compared to the other four 
states examined for this Article. See Table 1. 











Up Deps. as a % 
of Adult Felony 
Sentences 
KS 2010–2017 91,840 799 0.9 
MN 2010–2017 127,530 5,620 4.4 
NC 2010–2017 235,551 8,033 3.4 
OR 2016–2017 53,441 4,946 9.3 
WA 2010–2017 191,863 3,942 2.1 
 
Shifting sentencing for certain cases away from the presumptive 
sentencing guidelines to other range-raising approaches can not only reduce the 
volume of upward departures, but can also change the mix of offenses that 
receive upward departures. Some common upward-departure factors related to 
victimization—such as unusually severe harm or loss, vulnerable victim, 
multiple victims, or deliberate cruelty—are more likely to apply in crimes 
 
trigger Blakely. See KANSAS 2018 MANUAL, supra note 43, at 48–57 (outlining special-sentencing rules 
in Kansas). 
I did not attempt to track the application of enhancements and other sentencing statutes in the 
other states. Even if data are available, the number, type, applicability, and scope of enhancements vary 
significantly, even within a single state from year to year. See, e.g., WASH. COMM’N, 2019 REVIEW, 
supra note 30, at app. E (showing Washington’s Sentencing Enhancement Reference Guide). 
 46. Table includes figures for Kansas, North Carolina, and Washington from data provided by 
each state’s sentencing commission. The number for total adult felony sentences for Minnesota is from 
the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission’s Sentencing Practices published in 2018, MINN. 
SENT’G GUIDELINES COMM’N, 2017 SENTENCING PRACTICES 36 tbl.5 (2018) [hereinafter MINN. 
2017 SENTENCING PRACTICES], and the number of upward departures is from data that the Minnesota 
Sentencing Guidelines Commission provided to me for this Article. 
The total number of felonies sentenced for Oregon was estimated by multiplying the 
conviction rates from 2016 to 2017 (83%), OR. CRIM. JUST. COMM’N, 2019 SAC GRANT 
REPORT: FELONY CASE PROCESSING TRENDS IN OREGON 9 tbl.4.2.1 (2019) [hereinafter 2019 SAC 
GRANT REPORT], by the total felony cases terminated from 2016 to 2017 (64,387), OR. JUD. DEP’T, 
STATISTICAL REPORT RELATING TO THE CIRCUIT COURTS OF OREGON 1 tbl.2 (2017), 
https://www.courts.oregon.gov/about/Documents/ojd_2016_and_2017_Terminated_Case_Trend_Dat
a_v2.0_tas_2018-07-25.pdf [https://perma.cc/WE62-XEBV]. Even if the departure rate was calculated 
using all felony cases terminated—including dismissals, acquittals, and misdemeanor outcomes—
instead of estimated felony convictions alone, Oregon’s departure rate would still be much higher than 
the rate in other states (7.7%). 
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against persons or property crimes than in drug crimes, for example. Crimes 
with victims also attract more public attention, making them targets for 
mandatory minimum sentencing or enhanced-sentence legislation.47 When 
mandatory minimum and enhanced-sentencing provisions preempt guideline 
application to a particular crime type, the number of upward departures for that 
crime type may fall as well. 
Oregon is an example of this form of guidelines displacement. In Oregon, 
Measure 11 created minimum sentences for most violent offenses and many 
other serious crimes,48 essentially supplanting the presumptive sentencing 
guidelines for those cases.49 A later referendum (Measure 57) imposed 
minimum sentences for a large group of drug and property offenses, taking 
them outside of the guidelines as well.50 That may help to explain why less than 
eight percent of upward-departure sentences in Oregon are for crimes against 
persons, compared to other states, where the rate of upward departures is 
greatest for crimes against persons.51 See Table 2. 
Table 2. Crime Type Percentage of Total Upward Departures52 
 


















KS 40.7 325 ^ ^ 17.5 140 41.8^ 334^ 
MN 27.4 1540 27.3 1533 37.4 2100 8.0 447 
NC 28.2 2269 32.3 2595 26.1 2097 13.3 1072 
OR 7.4 367 27.0 1336 49.0 2423 16.6 820 
WA 43.4 1712 25.7 1015 14.5 572 16.3 643 
^ In Kansas, “other” includes both property and other cases combined. 
 
 47. See, e.g., WASH. SENT’G GUIDELINES COMM’N, 20 YEARS IN SENTENCING: A LOOK AT 
WASHINGTON STATE ADULT FELONY SENTENCING FISCAL YEARS 1989 TO 2008, at 49 (2010) 
(“[T]he sentences most likely to receive an enhancement are generally violent sentences.”). 
 48. For a handy chart showing covered offenses and the mandatory minimum sentences for each, 
see Measure 11 Crimes and Mandatory Minimum Sentences, MULTNOMAH CNTY., https://multco.us/dcj-
juvenile/common-laws/measure-11 [https://perma.cc/378U-KN2U]. 
 49. See id.; see also NAT’L RSCH. COUNCIL, THE GROWTH OF INCARCERATION, supra note 30, 
at 77 (“In Oregon, the committee that had drafted and monitored the guidelines was disbanded, and 
the guidelines were trumped by a broad-based mandatory minimum sentence law enacted in 1994.”). 
 50. OR. LEGIS. COMM. SERVS., BACKGROUND BRIEF ON FELONY SENTENCING 2–3 (2010) 
(listing sentence enhancements under Measure 57 for drug and property crimes). 
 51. See, e.g., MINN. 2017 SENTENCING PRACTICES, supra note 46, at 33 (“Aggravated durational 
departure rates were highest for intentional second-degree murder, assault in the first degree, and 
criminal sexual conduct in the first degree.”). 
 52. Figures are calculated from data provided by sentencing commissions in each state. All figures 
are for the years 2010–2017, except Oregon, where the data covers only 2016–2017. 
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B. Broadening Presumptive-Sentencing Ranges 
A second control on the number of upward departures in each state is the 
breadth of the state’s presumptive-sentencing ranges. Some states deliberately 
widened presumptive ranges after Blakely to allow judges to impose more severe 
sentences without triggering Blakely protections—a move that led to a drop in 
upward durational departures.53 In states that had no presumptive ceiling on 
terms of probation,54 judges could extend probation terms without an upward 
durational departure subject to Blakely.55 North Carolina and Washington also 
avoided upward dispositional departures altogether by including incarceration 
in many56 or all57 presumptive-sentencing ranges. 
C. Bypassing Blakely 
Even among sentences that are considered by a state to be upward 
departures, because states interpret the reach of the Court’s Apprendi doctrine 
differently, an upward departure may carry the right to a jury finding beyond a 
reasonable doubt in one state but not in another. The number of sentences 
affected by Blakely should shrink with narrow interpretations and grow with 
broader ones. 
 
 53. See WASH. COMM’N, 2019 REVIEW, supra note 30, at 5, 16–18; MINN. SENT’G GUIDELINES 
COMM’N, 2018 SENTENCING PRACTICES: ANNUAL SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR FELONY 
OFFENDERS SENTENCED IN 2018, at 31 (2019) [hereinafter MINN. 2018 SENTENCING PRACTICES] 
(“In response to the Blakely decision, the 2005 Legislature widened the ranges on the Standard Grid to 
15 percent below and 20 percent above the presumptive fixed sentenced, within which the court may 
sentence without departure.”); MINN. SENT’G GUIDELINES COMM’N, SENTENCING PRACTICES: 
IMPACT OF BLAKELY AND EXPANDED RANGES ON SENTENCING GRID 6 (2010) (reporting that 
“aggravated durational departures decreased from 6 to 3 percent” after Blakely and the legislature 
widening the sentencing range); see also FRASE, JUST SENTENCING, supra note 4, at 126–27 (noting 
expanded ranges to ease compliance with Blakely).  
 54. See, e.g., FRASE, JUST SENTENCING, supra note 4, at 126. 
 55. Minnesota added presumptive-probation terms this past year. See MINN. SENT’G 
GUIDELINES COMM’N, 2020 REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE, at app. 2.3 (2020) [hereinafter MINN. 
2020 REPORT] (detailing an amendment that would make this departure subject to jury trial). The 
minority report, however, warned that “[a]dopting the majority’s proposal for sentencing jury trials 
regarding the length of probation will increase costs for all criminal-justice stakeholders . . . . The 
judiciary, local county attorney offices, and the public-defense system will have to hear, prosecute, and 
defend the new Blakely trials. And, the public will be obligated to serve as jurors. The minority is 
concerned [about] the unprecedented, cost-increasing Blakely trial requirement . . . .” Id. at 110–11. 
 56. Of the seventy-two grid boxes on the Felony Punishment Chart in North Carolina, only three 
did not include active punishment as an option. N.C. SENT’G & POL’Y ADVISORY COMM’N, 
STRUCTURED SENTENCING TRAINING AND REFERENCE MANUAL 4 (2009). 
 57. See ROBINA INST. OF CRIM. L. & CRIM. JUST., JURISDICTION PROFILE: WASHINGTON     
5–7 (2019), https://sentencing.umn.edu/sites/sentencing.umn.edu/files/washington_profile_0.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3R59-L9D6]. 
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1. Exempting Upward Dispositional Departures from Blakely 
One way to narrow Blakely’s reach is to exclude upward dispositional 
departures altogether.58 As noted above, Washington and North Carolina 
accomplished this by including both nonincarceration and incarceration options 
in their presumptive-sentencing ranges.59 Kansas found a different way. Law 
there recognizes that imposing incarceration instead of presumptive probation 
is a dispositional departure but interprets Blakely narrowly to not reach this 
situation. Kansas courts continue to adhere to a 2002 Kansas Supreme Court 
decision that held that facts required for upward dispositional departures from 
the presumptive sentence may be found by judges at sentencing.60  
This position may have made some sense in 2002, as the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s 2000 decision in Apprendi involved a fact that lengthened the maximum 
term of incarceration (a durational departure) and did not address probation or 
suspended sentences (a dispositional departure). But it has been a tenuous 
policy at least since 2013, when the Court held in Alleyne v. United States61 that 
any fact raising the floor of a permissible sentencing range must receive the same 
treatment as a fact that raises the ceiling.62 That the penalty is a more severe 
type of punishment rather than a longer term of incarceration does not matter. 
As stated in Alleyne,63 increasing the “prescribed range of penalties” or 
“expos[ing] a defendant to a punishment greater than that otherwise legally 
prescribed” has the same constitutional meaning as raising the maximum term 
of incarceration.64 Nor does the discretion a judge retains under a presumptive-
 
 58. A later section in this Article examines upward dispositional departures in more detail, finding 
that almost all result from a plea agreement to a jail sentence rather than the presumptive-probation 
term. See infra notes 110–17 and accompanying text.  
 59. See supra notes 56–57 and accompanying text.  
 60. Before Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013), the Kansas Supreme Court held that the 
U.S. Constitution did not require jury factfinding for an upward dispositional departure—imposing a 
sentence of incarceration when the presumptive sentence is release on conditions. State v. Carr, 53 
P.3d 843, 849–50 (Kan. 2002). The court reasoned that probation was an “act of grace,” not a right, 
and that a judge’s decision to depart from a presumed probation sentence to a prison sentence did not 
change the amount of punishment but only “determines where an individual’s sentence will be 
supervised.” Id. 
 61. 570 U.S. 99 (2013). 
 62. Id. at 112–14. 
 63. Id. at 111–12 (“Consistent with common-law and early American practice, Apprendi concluded 
that any ‘facts that increase the prescribed range of penalties to which a criminal defendant is exposed’ 
are elements of the crime.” (quoting Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000)) (emphasis 
added)); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 483 n.10 (2002) (“[F]acts that expose a defendant to 
a punishment greater than that otherwise legally prescribed were by definition ‘elements’ of a separate legal 
offense.” (emphasis added)); Alleyne, 570 U.S. at 111–12 (“We held that the Sixth Amendment provides 
defendants with the right to have a jury find those facts beyond a reasonable doubt. While Harris 
limited Apprendi to facts increasing the statutory maximum, the principle applied in Apprendi applies 
with equal force to facts increasing the mandatory minimum.”). 
 64. Alleyne, 570 U.S. at 111–12; see also Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 601, 609 (2002) (applying 
Apprendi to the facts that make a defendant eligible for the death penalty, expanding the “range of 
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guidelines system to reject an upward departure appear to matter, as the Court 
explained when it applied Apprendi to the presumptive sentencing guidelines in 
Blakely.65 
Perhaps recognizing this, both Minnesota and Oregon treat upward 
dispositional departures—two-thirds of all upward departures in those 
states66—the same as upward durational departures.67 In Kansas, excluding 
upward dispositional departures shrinks the number of cases subject to the 
Blakely rule to an incredibly small 135 cases during the eight-year period 
spanning from 2010 to 2017—averaging about sixteen cases per year. See Table 
3. 





























KS  2010–2017 664 83.1 122 13 135 16.9 799 
MN 2010–2017 3705 65.9 1530 213 1793 31.9 5620 
OR  2016–2017 3106 62.8 1796 41 1837 37.1 4946 
 
A different policy decision slashed the number of upward dispositional 
departure cases reported in Minnesota. Until 2015, Minnesota followed the 
same practice as Oregon and Kansas: counting as an upward dispositional 
departure any sentence of incarceration when the presumed sentence was 
probation, including dispositional departures the defendant seeks.69 It is not 
 
penalties” from incarceration only to incarceration or death). Undoubtedly a fact that would change a 
presumptive sentence from a fine or incarceration to only incarceration would have the same effect. 
 65. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 305 n.8 (2004) (“Whether the judicially determined 
facts require a sentence enhancement or merely allow it, the verdict alone does not authorize the 
sentence.”).  
 66. See infra text accompanying note 68 (displaying Table 3). 
 67. State v. Allen, 706 N.W.2d 40, 47 (Minn. 2005) (holding that a defendant has a Sixth 
Amendment right to a jury trial on the factors used to support a decision to sentence a defendant to an 
executed prison term if a term of probation supervision is presumed to be appropriate under the 
presumptive sentencing guidelines); State v. Frinell, 414 P.3d 430, 433 (Or. Ct. App. 2018) (same). 
 68. Calculated from data provided by the sentencing commissions in each state. Minnesota’s total 
includes 122 consecutive upward-departure cases not counted in either the upward dispositional or 
durational columns. See infra note 111 and accompanying text (displaying Table 6). 
 69. See, e.g., KAN. 2018 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 42, at 64 (explaining that a dispositional 
departure occurs when incarceration is imposed instead of the recommended probation); OR. ADMIN. 
R. 213-003-0001(6) (Westlaw through rules filed through Mar. 23, 2021) (“‘Dispositional departure’ 
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uncommon for a criminal defendant to request incarceration rather than 
probation.70 If the defendant is serving time on a different charge, opting for 
incarceration rather than presumptive probation allows the defendant to 
complete both sentences simultaneously, rather than serving a supervised term 
on one offense only after completing a term of incarceration on the other.71 Or, 
instead of a probation term that would begin after sentencing, a defendant may 
prefer a sentence of time-served—a term of incarceration equivalent to the time 
already served in detention awaiting adjudication—which would end at 
sentencing. Also, a defendant may regard compliance with the conditions of 
probation as more onerous than serving a term of incarceration.72 
In 2015, the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission stopped 
counting requests for prison as upward dispositional departures.73 Reportedly, 
trial judges demanded this change, after expressing concern that their individual 
departure rates could be used against them politically and that including 
incarceration sentences that defendants had a right to request distorted those 
rates.74 Before the change, these requests for incarceration rather than probation 
constituted up to eighty-four percent of upward dispositional departures and 
fifty-one percent of all upward departures in the state.75 By 2017, because of the 
change, the rate of upward dispositional departures in the state dropped from 
3.3% of all cases to 0.8%.76 
As Part III will show, in every state, most upward departures, including 
upward dispositional departures, are imposed because defendants ask for them, 
 
means a sentence which imposes probation when the presumptive sentence is prison or prison when the 
presumptive sentence is probation.” (emphasis added)).  
 70. See infra Section III.A.1.a.  
 71. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 609.135 subdiv. 7 (2020). For example, Minnesota limited the right 
to request incarceration rather than release on conditions to cases with incarceration terms that were 
concurrent with or consecutive to another incarceration term or were at least nine months in duration. 
Id.  
 72. See, e.g., State v. Randolph, 316 N.W.2d 508, 510 (Minn. 1982) (holding that defendants have 
a right to request incarceration rather than release on conditions—known in Minnesota as “execution 
of sentence”—when the proposed conditions of probation are, in effect, more severe than the prison 
term would be). 
 73. See MINN. 2018 SENTENCING PRACTICES, supra note 53, at 24. 
 74. Zoom Interview with Richard Frase, Professor, Univ. Minn. L. Sch., Kay Knapp, Consultant, 
Robina Inst., Kelly Mitchell, Lecturer, Univ. Minn. L. Sch., Kevin Reitz, Professor, Univ. Minn. L. 
Sch. & Richard Walker, Senior Judge, Kan. Ct. App. (Oct. 18, 2020). 
 75. MINN. SENT’G GUIDELINES COMM’N, REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE 23 & n.50 (2017); 
MINN. SENT’G GUIDELINES COMM’N, 2013 SENTENCING PRACTICES: ANNUAL SUMMARY 
STATISTICS FOR FELONY OFFENDERS 24 (2014). 
 76. MINN. 2018 SENTENCING PRACTICES, supra note 53, at 24 (“The aggravated dispositional 
departure rate for [sentences in 2018 for offenses after the 2015 change] was 0.5 percent, compared to 
6.3 percent for 2018 cases with offense dates prior to August 1, 2015.”); MINN. 2017 SENTENCING 
PRACTICES, supra note 46, at 23 (noting that the rate of upward dispositional departures for those cases 
with dates after the change was 1.1%, compared to 5.2% for 2017 cases with offense dates prior to August 
1, 2015). 
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either as part of a plea or sentence agreement or in anticipation of some other 
benefit. Yet no state other than Minnesota has defined upward departures to 
exclude a sentence that is more severe in type or duration than the sentences 
permitted by the presumptive range because the defendant asked for that 
sentence. This manipulation of upward-departure statistics in Minnesota did 
not change the quantity of cases requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt to 
a jury—a defendant who seeks an upward departure essentially waives that 
right.77 But it is another striking example of how states construct those statistics 
differently. 
2. Exempting Upward Durational Departures for Probation  
Deliberately exempting probation terms that exceed the presumptive term 
from the Blakely rule is yet another way to shrink the impact of that case. 
Consider Kansas and Oregon. In both states, a term of probation that is longer 
than the term in the presumptive-sentencing range is an upward durational 
departure.78 Indeed, analysis of Oregon data for 2015 and 2016 revealed that 
these lengthened-probation terms constituted ninety-two percent of all upward 
durational departures. Presumably, these upward departures, if not stipulated 
or requested, would require the same jury factfinding beyond a reasonable doubt 
as other upward departures, but so far Oregon and Kansas courts have yet to 
admit that they do.79 Meanwhile, in 2020, Minnesota adopted a contrary 
position, that upward durational departures now carry the right to a jury 
determination beyond a reasonable doubt.80 
3. Exempting Prior Juvenile Adjudications or Supervisory Status at the Time 
of Commission  
Relying on the “exception” to the Apprendi rule for prior convictions,81 all 
five states set increasingly severe presumptive-sentence ranges based on 
 
 77. For a discussion of waiver, see infra Section IV.B.  
 78. OR. ADMIN. R. 213-005-0016 (Westlaw through rules filed through Mar. 23, 2021); see also 
State v. Hambright, 447 P.3d 972, 979–80 (Kan. 2019) (refusing to overrule earlier, pre-Apprendi 
precedent—State v. Whitesell, 13 P.3d 887 (Kan. 2000)—and finding that imposition of a probation 
term longer than the presumptive period is an upward durational departure requiring that the judge 
state substantial and compelling reasons for departure). 
 79. See State v. Gutierrez, 112 P.3d 433, 434–35 (Or. 2005). In State v. Hambright, 447 P.3d 972 
(Kan. 2019), the Kansas Supreme Court declined to address whether a defendant would have a right to 
a jury determination, stating “[I]t is not abundantly clear that Apprendi would be applicable here.” Id. 
at 979–80 (citing State v. Carr, 53 P.3d 843, 850 (Kan. 2002)).  
 80. See MINN. 2020 REPORT, supra note 55, at 101–19.  
 81. See Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99, 111 n.1 (2013) (reiterating the “narrow exception” 
for the fact of a prior conviction (citing Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 247 
(1998))). 
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increasingly severe criminal histories.82 Thus, there is no right to a jury finding 
of any of the prior convictions that make up the criminal history score, even 
when a higher score raises the presumptive-sentencing range. This free pass to 
use prior convictions to raise sentencing ranges also allows jurisdictions to 
condition the imposition of sentences higher than the presumptive-guideline 
range upon a judicial finding that a prior conviction was of a certain type, such 
as a violent offense or a sex offense. 
But states do not agree on whether a prior adjudication of juvenile 
delinquency fits within the prior-conviction exception.83 They also divide over 
how to treat the fact that an offense was committed while under supervision (on 
pretrial release, probation, or parole). Some states regard supervision status at 
the time of offense as a fact that falls outside the prior-conviction exception and 
thus it carries a right to proof beyond a reasonable doubt before a jury whenever 
it raises the presumptive-sentencing range.84 Others assume it falls within the 
exception and rely on that status in the calculation of the criminal history 
score.85 In these latter states, the set of cases implicating Blakely would be much 
 
 82. See KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-6804 to -6805 (Westlaw through laws enacted during the 
2021 Reg. Sess. of the Kan. Leg. effective on Apr. 1, 2021); MINN. SENT’G 
GUIDELINES COMM’N, MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND COMMENTARY § 2.C.1 & 
cmt. 2.C.01 (2019) [hereinafter 2019 MINN. GUIDELINES AND COMMENTARY]; 2014 
N.C. STRUCTURED SENTENCING MANUAL, supra note 40, at 6; OR. ADMIN. R. 213-004-0001 
(Westlaw through rules filed through Mar. 23, 2021); THE OREGON SENTENCING GUIDELINES 
GRID, https://www.oregon.gov/cjc/resources/documents/guidelinesgrid.pdf [https://perma.cc/3XAV-
88VX]; WASH. STATE CASELOAD FORECAST COUNCIL, 2018 WASHINGTON STATE ADULT 
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUEL 52 (2018); see also WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.94A.535(2)(b), 
(d) (LEXIS through chapter 9 of the 2021 Reg. Sess.) (jury findings are not required for upward 
departure if “[t]he defendant’s prior unscored misdemeanor or prior unscored foreign criminal history 
results in a presumptive sentence that is clearly too lenient in light of the purpose of this chapter”). 
 83. See, e.g., State v. McFee, 721 N.W.2d 607, 619 (Minn. 2006) (allowing juvenile 
adjudications); State v. Harris, 118 P.3d 236, 246 (Or. 2005) (en banc) (“[W]e hold that the use of 
prior juvenile adjudications as sentencing factors in Oregon does not violate the jury trial right 
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.”); State v. Weber, 149 P.3d 646, 648 (Wash. 2006) (en banc) 
(holding that prior juvenile adjudications fall under “prior conviction” exception); see also RICHARD S. 
FRASE, JULIAN V. ROBERTS, RHYS HESTER & KELLY LYN MITCHELL, CRIMINAL HISTORY 
ENHANCEMENTS SOURCEBOOK 48–49 (2015). 
 84. North Carolina insists on proof beyond a reasonable doubt under Blakely for supervision or 
custodial status as an enhancement factor, see, e.g., State v. Everette, 361 N.C. 646, 651–54, 652 S.E.2d 
241, 244–45 (2007); State v. Wissink, 361 N.C. 418, 419, 645 S.E.2d 761, 761 (2007) (per curiam), as 
does Oregon, see, e.g., State v. Gallino, 206 P.3d 204, 205 (Or. 2009); State v. Bray, 160 P.3d 983, 989 
n.1, 990 (Or. 2007) (holding that “persistent involvement in similar offenses or repetitive assaults” 
requires a jury finding). But see State v. Hinton, 263 N.C. App. 532, 538–41, 823 S.E.2d 667, 672–74 
(2019) (declining to decide whether Blakely bars judicial finding under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-
1340.16(b) that the defendant had a past judgment of a willful probation violation). 
 85. 2019 MINN. GUIDELINES AND COMMENTARY, supra note 82, § 2.B.1 & cmt. 2.B.201; State 
v. Brooks, 690 N.W.2d 160, 162–63 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004) (upholding use of “custody status” in 
criminal history score as within the exception for prior convictions); State v. Jones, 149 P.3d 636, 640 
(Wash. 2006) (en banc) (holding that facts “intimately related” to the conviction, including whether 
the offense was committed while on release, fall within the exception for prior convictions); see also 
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larger if it included every sentence in which a higher range depended upon a 
finding that the offense was committed on release. 
4. Other Blakely Exemptions 
Additional Blakely carveouts divide these states. In a split decision, 
Minnesota’s Supreme Court interpreted Blakely to allow a judge to determine 
whether the facts proven to a jury or admitted by the defendant constitute 
“particular cruelty,”86 while Oregon, Kansas, and Washington submit similar 
aggravating factors to juries.87 States may also report sentences that the U.S. 
Supreme Court has specifically excluded from Blakely protections as upward 
departures. For example, some consecutive sentences are considered upward 
departures carrying a right to a jury factfinding in Minnesota and Washington, 
despite the U.S. Supreme Court’s holding in Oregon v. Ice,88 which rejected that 
rule under the U.S. Constitution.89 
 
WASH. STATE CASELOAD FORECAST COUNCIL, 2018 WASH. STATE ADULT SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES MANUAL 52, 57 (2018) (including in the “offender score” the time between prior 
offenses); Jones, 149 P.3d at 638 (analyzing the commission of an offense while on supervision); State 
v. Brinkley, 369 P.3d 157, 160 (Wash. Ct. App. 2016) (outlining the timing of convictions). Courts in 
other states without presumptive sentencing guidelines are divided over this question as well, see 
authority collected in LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 13, § 26.4(i) n.248.  
 86. State v. Rourke, 773 N.W.2d 913, 921–22 (Minn. 2009) (“Blakely does not require a district 
court to submit the aggravating factor of particular cruelty to a jury . . . .”). The dissent explained why 
a jury must find this aggravating factor like any other and noted that Washington had drafted jury 
instructions for its similar aggravating factor. Id. at 925–29 (Anderson, J., dissenting); see also William 
W. Berry III & Carissa Byrne Hessick, Sixth Amendment Sentencing After Hurst, 66 UCLA L. REV. 
448, 512 (2019) (“[T]he Blakely Court characterized the finding of ‘deliberate cruelty’ as an ‘aggravating 
fact,’ and it is difficult to see how Minnesota’s ‘particular cruelty’ factor is any different.”). The other 
holding in State v. Rourke, 773 N.W.2d 913 (Minn. 2009), that presumptive sentencing guidelines are 
not subject to vagueness challenges, is also controversial. See Beckles v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 886, 
892 (2017) (distinguishing advisory guidelines, which are not subject to vagueness challenges, from 
statutes that fix the range of permissible punishment, which are).  
 87. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-6815(b), (c)(2)(B) (Westlaw through laws enacted during the 2021 
Reg. Sess. of the Kan. Leg. effective on Apr. 1, 2021) (covering “excessive brutality”); OR. ADMIN. R. 
213-008-0002(1)(b)(J) (Westlaw through rules filed through Mar. 23, 2021) (“The degree of harm or 
loss [involved] . . . was significantly greater than typical for such an offense.”); WASH. REV. CODE 
ANN. § 9.94A.535(3)(a) (LEXIS through chapter 9 of the 2021 Reg. Sess.). Professors William Berry 
III and Carissa Hessick have argued that even the “substantial and compelling” decision reserved for 
the judge should require a jury finding. See Berry & Hessick, supra note 86, at 514–17.  
 88. 555 U.S. 160 (2009). 
 89. Id. at 164, 172; see MINN. SENT’G GUIDELINES COMM’N, MINNESOTA SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES AND COMMENTARY § 2.F (2020) [hereinafter 2020 MINN. GUIDELINES AND 
COMMENTARY]; State v. Ice, 204 P.3d 1290, 1290 (Or. 2009) (per curiam); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 9.94A.535 (LEXIS through chapter 9 of the 2021 Reg. Sess.). These are not common, and over the 
eight-year period, only 122 cases with consecutive departures lacked either an upward dispositional or 
upward durational departure. See infra note 111 and accompanying text (displaying Table 6).  
With no need to comply with Blakely, consecutive sentences may provide an attractive substitute 
for an upward departure. See FRASE, JUST SENTENCING, supra note 4, at 177–80, 198–201; Stemen & 
Wilhelm, supra note 16, at 8. 
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These varying interpretations of the Constitution’s commands can have a 
dramatic effect on the volume of sentences that might carry a right to a jury 
factfinding beyond a reasonable doubt for an aggravating fact. 
*    *    * 
Despite worries that it would be prohibitively expensive to provide the 
right to a jury trial for aggravating facts,90 the overall number of cases carrying 
this right makes up a small subset of felony sentences. And yes, in Kansas—
exhibit A for the claim that the costs of Blakely are “small and manageable”—
the number of cases subject to the Blakely rule, as that rule is interpreted by 
Kansas courts, is less than a couple dozen per year. This is indeed a miniscule 
portion of the well over 10,000 felony sentences in Kansas annually.91 But that 
tiny number appears to be at least partially the result of uniquely narrow 
interpretations of constitutional mandates, as well as choices concerning the 
scope and design of the presumptive sentencing guidelines and sentencing laws, 
that are unlike those of other states and the MPCS model. Other states, too, 
have adopted controversial, if not arbitrary, policies that have shrunk the 
number of upward departures subject to Blakely. In sum, the rate of upward 
departures that might require proof beyond a reasonable doubt before a jury is 
not inevitably as low as the rates reported by these states. Instead, that rate—
and the concept of upward departure itself—can be manipulated. Any 
jurisdiction considering adopting presumptive sentencing should be aware of 
the potential impact of these choices. 
III. BARGAINING OVER UPWARD DEPARTURES: TOOLS TO ENGINEER 
STIPULATED SENTENCES AND LEVERAGE PLEAS 
This part examines the function of upward departures in bargaining. 
Section III.A examines bargaining patterns in guilty plea cases with upward 
departures, how often upward departures are not contested, and the reasons that 
defendants and judges agree to them. Section III.B presents the claim by 
supporters of presumptive sentencing guidelines that compared to mandatory 
minimum sentences, upward departures transfer less sentencing power away 
from judges to prosecutors.92 Section III.C examines this claim using unique 
data from Minnesota. 
 
 90. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.  
 91. See supra notes 46, 68 and accompanying text (displaying Tables 1 & 3). 
 92. See infra notes 149–68 and accompanying text. 
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A. Uncontested Upward Departures—A Tool To Engineer Stipulated Sentences 
Reports from state sentencing commissions in Washington and 
Minnesota93 and interviews of practitioners and judges in Oregon and North 
Carolina94 suggested that almost all upward-departure sentences were not 
contested by the defendant. Data provided from Minnesota, Washington, and 
Kansas, and court records in Oregon, Kansas, and Minnesota confirmed this. 
After documenting the low incidence of cases in which a defendant disputes an 
upward departure, I turn to the reasons that defendants agree to them so often. 
1. The Extent of Agreement 
All but a small percentage of those convicted of a crime in the United 
States plead guilty; trials are the exception. This appears to be true for cases 
involving upward-departure sentences as well. In Washington, more than 
eighty-six percent of defendants receiving upward-departure sentences pled 
guilty. In the four other presumptive-guidelines states examined here, 
defendants who receive upward-departure sentences went to trial at a rate that 
is only slightly higher or even lower than the trial rate for felony defendants 
generally.95 See Table 4. Oregon’s low trial rate for cases with upward-departure 
sentences96 could be explained by the exclusion of most serious felonies from 
Oregon’s guidelines97 and the prevailing use of upward departures as bargaining 
tools to avoid more severe sentences, discussed below. 
  
 
 93. See MINN. 2018 SENTENCING PRACTICES, supra note 53, at 22 (“[T]hese departure statistics 
should be reviewed with an understanding that, when the court pronounces a particular sentence, there 
is commonly agreement or acceptance among the other actors that the sentence is appropriate. Only a 
small percent of cases (1%–2%) result in an appeal of the sentence . . . .”); see also WASH. COMM’N, 
2019 REVIEW, supra note 30, at 5 (“[M]ost sentencing decisions are presented to the judge as an agreed 
disposition. In 90+% of felony sentencings (a figure essentially the same across the country), the judge 
hears both prosecution and defense ask for the same sentence. In Washington, that is almost always a 
period of months of incarceration within the standard range set by the SRA.”). 
 94. These interviews were conducted in 2016 for a different project. See Nancy J. King & Ronald 
F. Wright, The Invisible Revolution in Plea Bargaining: Managerial Judging and Judicial Participation in 
Negotiations, 95 TEX. L. REV. 325, 338–55 nn.65–183, 361–92 nn.218–388 (2016) [hereinafter King & 
Wright, Judicial Participation]. 
 95. To check if the higher trial rate for departure sentences might reflect a different crime-type 
mix, I compared trial rate by crime type for North Carolina and Kansas, the only two states where that 
information was available. In those two states, with the exception of drug crimes, the trial rates for 
upward-departure cases were higher than trial rates among all felonies of the same crime type. 
 96. See infra note 99.  
 97. See supra text accompanying notes 48–51.  
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Table 4. Trial Rates, Total Adult Felony and Upward-Departure Cases 
Compared98 
 
Trial Rate: Adult Felony 
Cases 
Trial Rate: Upward-Departure 
Cases Only 
KS^ 3.2 4.3 
MN 3.0 4.2 
NC 2.2 4.0 
OR n/a99 2.4 
WA 5.3 13.2 
^ KS felony cases include only guideline (“grid”) cases. 
 
The trial rates for the aggravating facts that a state must prove before the 
judge may impose these upward-departure sentences are even lower than the 
trial rates for conviction reported in Table 4. This is because defendants 
convicted at trial often waive the right to a jury trial of the aggravating fact and 
opt for a bench trial instead or simply admit the aggravating fact.100 For 
example, in Minnesota, roughly one in four defendants receiving an upward-
departure sentence after being convicted at trial did not contest that sentence.101 
Analysis of sentencing information provided by the states confirmed that 
most of the upward departures were imposed with the agreement of the 
 
 98. Kansas, North Carolina, and Washington figures are from data provided by each state’s 
sentencing commissions. The figures for the trial rate for adult felony cases in Minnesota are calculated 
from data from the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission. MINN. SENT’G GUIDELINES 
COMM’N, 2014 SENTENCING PRACTICES: ANNUAL SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR FELONY 
OFFENDERS (2015); MINN. SENT’G GUIDELINES COMM’N, 2015 SENTENCING PRACTICES: 
ANNUAL SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR FELONY OFFENDERS (2016); MINN. SENT’G GUIDELINES 
COMM’N, 2016 SENTENCING PRACTICES: ANNUAL SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR FELONY 
OFFENDERS (2017); MINN. SENT’G GUIDELINES COMMISSION, 2017 SENTENCING PRACTICES: 
ANNUAL SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR FELONY OFFENDERS SENTENCED IN 2017 (2018). The figures 
for the Minnesota trial rate for upward-departure cases only are calculated from data provided by the 
Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission. 
 99. Information on the trial rate for all felony cases in Oregon in 2016 and 2017 was not available. 
However, if the rates were similar to other years, it appears that the trial rate for upward-departure 
cases is lower than the trial rate for all felonies, unlike the other states. See OR. JUD. DEP’T, 
STATISTICAL REPORT RELATING TO THE CIRCUIT COURTS OF THE STATE OF OREGON 83 (2011), 
https://www.courts.oregon.gov/about/Documents/2011_CircuitCourtCaseStatistics.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/5UUD-KDXP] (reporting a trial rate of all felony terminations as 4.4% in 2011); OR. JUD. 
DEP’T, CASES TRIED ANALYSIS - MANNER OF DISPOSITION 1 (2018), https://www. 
courts.oregon.gov/about/Documents/2018CasesTriedAnalysis-MannerofDisposition.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/29VU-2R24] (reporting a trial rate of 3.3% in 2018); OR. JUD. DEP’T, CASES TRIED 
ANALYSIS - MANNER OF DISPOSITION 1 (2019), https://www.courts.oregon.gov/about/Documents/ 
2019CasesTriedAnalysis-MannerofDisposition.pdf [https://perma.cc/3ASW-8K9T] (reporting a trial 
rate of 4.6% in 2019). 
 100. See infra notes 210, 216 and accompanying text (discussing waiver).  
 101. See infra note 212 and accompanying text.  
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defendant, either as part of a plea agreement or because the defendant did not 
contest the issue following their conviction at trial. Although it was not possible 
to confirm whether or not the defendant agreed to the departure sentence in 
many cases, among the discernable cases reported below in Table 5, it appears 
that most of these upward departures were not contested.102 In the sections that 
follow, I detail some of the reasons why defendants choose not to contest 
upward departures. 
Table 5. Percentage of Upward-Departures Cases Where Information 
Clearly Indicated That the Defendant Agreed to the Departure as Part of a 
Plea Agreement, Stipulation, or Request103 
 Percentage of Upward Departures  








^ Kansas reporting percentage of upward durational departures only, while other 
states reporting percentage of all upward departures 
2. Why Defendants Agree to Upward Departures  
In theory, upward departures are supposed to be limited to cases in which 
“the defendant’s conduct [in the offense of conviction] was significantly more 
. . . serious than that typically involved in the commission of the crime in 
question.”104 Instead, this examination of the data and dockets available reveals 
that upward departures are frequently imposed not to punish culpable behavior 
 
 102. Table 5 probably understates the extent of uncontested departures quite a bit. The lack of 
notices in nine out of ten upward-departure cases settled by a plea in Minnesota, see infra Section III.C, 
suggests that, in all those cases, the defendant had waived notice and agreed to that sentence as part of 
a plea bargain. Rates of agreement were higher for plea cases with mixed departures (upward as well as 
downward) than for plea cases with upward departures only. In Oregon, too, open pleas without a plea 
agreement as to sentence are reportedly rare. See 2019 SAC GRANT REPORT, supra note 46, at 1 & n.2 
(stating that, regarding cases concluding with at least one guilty plea, “[w]ith rare exception [the guilty 
plea] represents a plea deal”). 
 103. Figures are from data provided by the sentencing commissions in each state, all for the years 
from 2010 to 2017, except Oregon, with data from only 2016 to 2017. Figures exclude plea cases where 
it was not clear from the docket sheet whether the defendant had agreed to the departure or the judge 
determined it. In Oregon, this was a very large portion—forty-seven percent of guilty plea cases coded. 
 104. State v. Broten, 343 N.W.2d 38, 41 (Minn. 1984); see also State v. Cardenas, 914 P.2d 57, 61 
(Wash. 1996) (noting that egregious conduct beyond that typical of the crime on a defendant’s part 
may justify an exceptional sentence); MODEL PENAL CODE: SENT’G § 9.04 cmt. d (AM. L. INST., 
forthcoming 2021) (on file with author). For a thorough analysis of the debate about reserving 
departures for circumstances related to proportionality of punishment rather than utilitarian reasons, 
see MODEL PENAL CODE: SENT’G §§ 1.02(2)(a)(i), 9.05 cmt. e, 10.03 cmt. e (AM. L. INST., 
forthcoming 2021) (on file with author); Frase, Forty Years, supra note 14, at 111–12. 
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or more dangerous offenders, but because an upward departure is the most 
convenient way to reach a sentence—often a more lenient outcome—that the 
parties prefer. 
Before turning to the findings that support this claim, an explanation of 
the information on which it is based may be helpful. In Kansas, Minnesota, 
North Carolina, and Oregon, the judge is supposed to place the specific basis 
for upward departure on the record—a plea agreement or stipulation to the 
upward departure is not itself a sufficient reason for upward departure.105 
(Washington requires only that the judge find a stipulated sentence be 
“consistent with and in furtherance of the interests of justice and the purposes 
of the sentencing reform act.”)106 Fortunately, information about the reasons 
for upward departures was available for every state but North Carolina.107 Even 
so, specific reasons other than the defendant’s stipulation, request, or agreement 
were not available in every case; in fifty to eighty percent of upward-departure 
cases, depending on the state, neither the docket sheet nor sentencing data 
provided any reason for the upward departure other than stipulation or plea 
agreement.108 The requirement of a separate reason must be difficult to enforce 
in cases with uncontested upward departures, which will likely never be 
appealed.109 
a. Opting for Incarceration  
In a surprising number of cases, defendants preferred incarceration to 
probation, agreeing to or requesting an upward dispositional departure to an 
 
 105. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-6817(a)(4) (Westlaw through laws enacted during the 2021 Reg. Sess. 
of the Kan. Leg. effective on Apr. 1, 2021); State v. Shull, 381 P.3d 499, 505–06 (Kan. Ct. App. 2016); 
2020 MINN. GUIDELINES AND COMMENTARY, supra note 89, § 2.D.1.c & cmt. 2.D.104 (“When a 
plea agreement involves a departure from the presumptive sentence, the court should cite the reasons 
that underlie the plea agreement or explain its reasons for accepting the negotiation.”); State v. 
Misquadace, 644 N.W.2d 65, 71–72 (Minn. 2002) (holding that a plea agreement standing alone is not 
a sufficient basis for an upward departure); 2014 N.C. STRUCTURED SENTENCING MANUAL, supra 
note 40, at 20; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.16(c) (LEXIS through Sess. Laws 2021-6 of the 2021 Reg. 
Sess. of the Gen. Assemb.); OR. ADMIN. R. 213-008-0001 (Westlaw current with rules filed through 
February 16, 2021); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.94A.535 (LEXIS through chapter 9 of the 2021 Reg. 
Sess.). Indeed, in Oregon, upward departure cases require two different reasons when sentencing to 
both a dispositional and durational departure. State v. Ferrell, 933 P.2d 973, 975–76 (Or. Ct. App. 
1997) (noting that the sentencing court must give distinct “substantial and compelling reasons” for the 
additional durational departure). 
 106. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.94A.535(2)(a) (LEXIS through chapter 9 of the 2021 Reg. 
Sess.). 
 107. Reasons for upward-departure sentences were available from the state sentencing 
commissions in Kansas, Minnesota, and Washington, and from notations on docket sheets in Kansas 
and Oregon. 
 108. This does not mean one was not provided in the record, only that it did not appear in either 
the data provided by the relevant state’s sentencing commission or in the docket sheets available. 
 109. See infra notes 132–35 and accompanying text.  
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incarceration sentence. As explained earlier,110 such defendants prefer a sentence 
of time served rather than a new probation term, are (or will be) serving time 
on another charge anyway, or wish to avoid onerous conditions of probation. In 
all three of the states that distinguished between upward dispositional and 
upward durational departures, a large proportion of upward dispositional 
departures appeared to reflect this situation. More than eighty percent of 
upward departures in Kansas were dispositional, and in Oregon and Minnesota, 
two-thirds were dispositional, even though in Minnesota the Minnesota 
Sentencing Guidelines Commission stopped counting requests for 
incarceration as upward departures in 2015. See Table 6. 
Table 6. Type of Upward Departure—Including Combinations111 
 Upward Dispositional Departures Upward Durational Departures 






















KS 503 161 664 83.1 122 0 122 13 135 799 
MN 2888 815 3705 65.9 1274 256 1530 213 1793 5620 
OR 3064 42 3106 62.8 709 1087 1796 41 1837 4946 
 
A closer look at these cases is informative. In Oregon, almost all (ninety-
seven percent) of the upward dispositional departures to incarceration from 
probation were the result of pleas, and among cases in which the defendant’s 
position on the aggravating factor could be determined,112 ninety-nine percent 
agreed to the upward departure.113 They were almost entirely short jail 
sentences of six months or less.114 Seventy percent were convictions for drug 
 
 110. See supra notes 69–72 and accompanying text (discussing requests for incarceration rather than 
probation in Minnesota).  
 111. Figures are calculated from the data provided by the state sentencing commissions in Kansas 
and Minnesota from 2010 to 2017 and in Oregon from 2016 to 2017. The totals reported for Minnesota 
upward dispositional departures include two cases with an upward consecutive departure as well; the 
total for upward durational departures includes fifty cases with an upward consecutive departure also; 
the total for any upward departures includes 122 cases in which the only upward departure was a 
consecutive departure. 
 112. In Oregon, information about whether the defendant agreed to or contested the aggravating 
factor, and the reasons for departure, was gleaned from docket sheets and appellate documents. See 
supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
 113. Oregon law used to include the right to reject probation in favor of incarceration, State v. 
Carmickle, 762 P.2d 290, 297 (Or. 1988), but that was changed by statute, OR. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 137.010(4) (Westlaw through laws enacted in the 2020 Reg. Sess. of the 80th Legis. Assemb.). 
 114. Ninety-three percent were jail; ninety-one percent had sentences of six months or less. The 
short jail terms suggest most of these were time-served sentences exchanged for the plea. 
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crimes. A small number of cases involved upward dispositional departures to 
prison from presumptive jail, listing as reasons prison-exclusive programming 
that was not available in jail or that the defendant was already serving another 
term in prison. About one percent of upward dispositional departures were 
combined with a downward durational departure. Similar patterns appeared in 
Kansas115 and Minnesota.116 
This pervasive use of upward dispositional departures to obtain a sentence 
more favorable to the defendant muddles the meaning of upward departures. In 
these cases, an upward-departure sentence does not indicate that the offense or 
offender was extraordinarily bad. Certainly, some of them could have been. But 
most of these cases suggest something entirely different—that pretrial 
detention policies and not the presumptive sentencing guidelines are setting the 
sentence at whatever time the defendant has already served while awaiting 
disposition; that defendants consider supervised probation to be worse than 
incarceration for one reason or another; or that if certain programming or 
treatment was available while on probation or in jail, some defendants would 
not be in prison. 
If upward dispositional departures are not achieving the desired goal of 
singling out the worst offenses or offenders, one option is to eliminate them 
entirely by including an incarceration option in every presumptive-sentencing 
range, as Washington does.117 Alternatively, if preserving presumptive 
probation is helpful in reducing the use of incarceration overall, reforms that 
reduce pretrial detention, eliminate onerous terms of probation, and provide 
more comprehensive programming options outside of prison could reduce this 
routine use of upward dispositional departures. 
b. Opting for Probation Instead of Incarceration, with a Longer Term if 
Revoked  
Unique to Oregon and Minnesota were upward durational departures 
combined with downward dispositional departures to probation (also referred 
 
 115. In Kansas, almost all upward dispositional departures were from presumptive probation up to 
incarceration. In twenty-nine percent of these cases, the reason for the departure was not clear, but 
among the remaining cases, fifty-eight percent noted that the defendant had agreed to the departure 
(twenty-six percent of these noted that the defendant had requested it, and twelve percent referenced 
either “time served” or that the defendant was already serving a concurrent sentence). Only thirteen 
percent of the upward dispositional departures to incarceration noted a reason that appeared to be one 
the defendant might have contested, including being detained in jail rather than placed on probation 
for immigration enforcement (indicated by “ICE hold” or “for deportation” notations). 
 116. In Minnesota, the upward dispositional departure sentences were to prison from probation 
(as opposed to prison from jail), most with terms of just over a year. Of these, ninety-nine percent 
were plea convictions, and fifty-five percent of these were upward departures requested by the 
defendant, a small number of which were to obtain treatment or programming. A larger portion than 
that in Oregon involved a downward durational departure as well—twenty-two percent. 
 117. See WASH. 2018 MANUAL, supra note 6, § 4. 
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to as “down dis / up dur departures” in Table 6). In Oregon, as Table 6 reports, 
this represented twenty-two percent of all upward-departure cases. Oregon 
practitioners and judges explained in interviews for an earlier project that the 
parties in these cases were avoiding the mandatory minimum sentences for 
property offenses that apply under Measure 57 (as the only path to a downward 
departure in Measure 57 cases is a stipulation by both parties).118 Prosecutors 
and judges had an extra incentive to do this in presumptive-prison cases in some 
counties participating in the Justice Reinvestment Initiative, which provided 
financial rewards for reduced reliance on imprisonment.119 In exchange for the 
prosecutor’s agreement to waive the mandatory minimum in favor of probation, 
optimistic defendants agreed to serve a longer term of incarceration in the event 
that their probation was revoked.120  
Data analysis was consistent with this account. Ninety-nine percent of 
these upward durational / downward dispositional departures were guilty pleas, 
with uncontested aggravating factors in ninety-seven percent of the cases in 
which that information was available.121 Moreover, in contrast to the drug-heavy 
convictions seen in upward dispositional departures to jail, two-thirds of these 
deals for longer terms of probation rather than incarceration were for property 
offenses.122 
In Minnesota, too, similar plea bargains are unexceptional. As of 2020, of 
the eighteen percent of offenders on probation for more than five years, most 
 
 118. See OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 137.717(6) (Westlaw through laws enacted in the 2020 Reg. Sess. 
of the 80th Legis. Assemb.) (mandating that Measure 57’s terms were required “unless the parties stipulate 
otherwise or the court finds” that all of four enumerated mitigating factors are present (emphasis 
added)); see also Act of July 25, 2013, ch. 649, §§ 5–16, 2013 OR. LAWS 1, 3–8 (codified in scattered 
sections of OR. REV. STAT. ANN.) (including the proposed amendments in Measure 57).  
 119. See King & Wright, Judicial Participation, supra note 94, at 351–54 (discussing the Justice 
Reinvestment Initiative and its mechanisms and results). But cf. George Ebo Browne, A Pre- and Post-
Implementation Assessment of Kansas’ HB 2170 Statute, 30 FED. SENT’G REP. 108, 112 (2017) (stating that 
in Kansas “the use of JRI prison sanctions is perceived to have contributed to a higher number of 
offenders in prison”). 
 120. See King & Wright, Judicial Participation, supra note 94, at 351–55. Relatedly, an Oregon judge 
noted that “[prosecutors] often ask us to go outside the guidelines, the local practice here is to stipulate 
to a grid block that is not necessarily the defendant’s actual grid block. The DAs favorite thing has been 
for some time now, they’ll stipulate to a grid block that is much higher than the Defendant’s actual grid 
block, but the client was willing to do this on the condition that there is a departure downward from 
the presumptive sentence to probation. If he violates while on probation, he goes to prison for that 
higher sentence . . . . The defendants all think they can do it. The DA knows that he’s not going to and 
will get that prison sentence. We revoke probation on so many of these.” NANCY J. KING & RONALD 
F. WRIGHT, MANAGERIAL JUDGING AND JUDICIAL PLEA NEGOTIATIONS: FURTHER EVIDENCE 21 
(2017) [hereinafter KING & WRIGHT, MANAGERIAL JUDGING], https://ssrn.com/abstract=2972294 
[https://perma.cc/5WE5-QEVK] (reporting additional quotations from field interviews for The 
Invisible Revolution in Plea Bargaining: Managerial Judging and Judicial Participation in Negotiations, see 
supra note 94).  
 121. This could be determined in seventy-two percent of guilty plea cases of this type. 
 122. Only four percent had a drug crime as the most serious offense. 
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had opted for “a plea agreement in which the offender received a second chance: 
no presumptive imprisonment in exchange for a longer length of probation 
supervision.”123 Data revealed that five percent of all upward-departure 
sentences in the state involved a deal combining a downward dispositional 
departure to probation and an upward durational departure on the stayed prison 
sentence.124 Rather than an option for judges to provide atypically punitive 
sentences to atypically culpable defendants, upward departures in these cases 
are tools prosecutors use for striking bargains with defendants who need not be 
incarcerated. 
c. Swapping Upward Departures for Lesser Charges; Avoiding Mandatory 
Minimum Sentences 
Defendants also agreed to upward-departure sentences in return for charge 
concessions from the prosecutor in the form of either fewer counts or a lesser 
charge.125 This arrangement allows the defendant to avoid a higher presumptive 
range, a mandatory minimum sentence (by pleading to attempt, for example, to 
avoid a minimum sentence for the completed crime126), or an undesirable 
collateral consequence for the charge the prosecutor agrees not to pursue (when 
it qualifies as a “strike” for a recidivist statute, for example, or would lead to 
deportation or sex offender registration).127 A practitioner in Oregon explained 
this was common, reporting that they would “pick the correct sentence and 
engineer backwards.”128 
 
 123. MINN. 2020 REPORT, supra note 55, at 115–16. 
 124. See supra note 111 and accompanying text (displaying Table 6).  
 125. For the years 2016 to 2017, a report found charge bargains to lesser offenses occurred in thirty-
five percent of crimes-against-persons cases but less than twenty percent for other crimes. See 2019 
SAC GRANT REPORT, supra note 46, at 6 fig. 4.1.4; see also Shawn D. Bushway & Anne M. Piehl, 
Measuring and Explaining Charge Bargaining, 23 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 105, 122 (2007) 
(finding, in a study of charge bargaining and sentencing, that in Washington, reduced judicial 
discretion shifted to charge reductions rather than sentence reductions); Richard S. Frase, The 
Apprendi-Blakely Cases: Sentencing Reform Counter-Revolution, 6 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 403, 
425 (2007) (predicting that Blakely may increase charge bargaining). 
 126. See OR. CRIM. JUST. COMM’N, LONGITUDINAL STUDY OF THE APPLICATION OF 
MEASURE 11 AND MANDATORY MINIMUMS IN OREGON 32 (2011) [hereinafter OR. CRIM. JUST. 
COMM’N, LONGITUDINAL M11 STUDY] (finding that “after the passage of M11 the plea down process 
changed and resulted in many more convictions for M11 attempts,” which are sentenced under the 
guidelines at a lower seriousness level); see also Darryl K. Brown, Can Prosecutors Temper the Criminal 
Code by Bringing Factually Baseless Charges and by Charging Nonexistent Crimes?, MARQUETTE LAW., Fall 
2020, at 32, 33–36 (discussing “factually baseless pleas” that “provide a somewhat lower sentencing 
range than is available under the original charge”).  
 127. See, e.g., Thea Johnson, Fictional Pleas, 94 IND. L.J. 855, 878–79 (2019) (noting judges accept 
fictional pleas “to avoid trials” but also to avoid deportation of the defendant). 
 128. King & Wright, Judicial Participation, supra note 94, at 374 & n.284 (documenting the 
observations of Oregon defense attorneys); see also id. at 353 n.163 (noting a judge who stated that 
assault might be settled as attempt to get the parties’ desired sentence); KING & WRIGHT, 
MANAGERIAL JUDGING, supra note 120, at 21 (noting Oregon defense attorneys who reported 
stipulating to upward departures in return for charge concessions).  
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As discussed earlier, depending upon your perspective, the prosecutor’s 
ability to manipulate charges to control the sentence is either the most serious 
threat there is to the coherence of presumptive sentencing guidelines129 or the 
most important power the prosecutor has to dispense leniency and avoid the 
undesirable consequences of mandatory sentencing laws. Either way, charge 
bargaining is inevitable, and the option of trading upward-departure sentences 
for lesser charges provides even more options for the prosecution. 
3. Why Judges Routinely Accept Stipulated Upward Departures  
The examples above show how upward departures are used by the parties 
for reasons unrelated to the purposes they are supposed to serve. In this section, 
I briefly address the obvious question: Why are judges going along with this? 
There is no doubt that they do. In Oregon, for example, docket sheets 
suggested that judges were willing to facilitate upward departures when agreed 
to by the parties even when the facts in the case did not necessarily support the 
sentence or the sentencing-guideline range. Some docket notations candidly 
indicated that the sentence ignored the “actual” guidelines sentence, with the 
parties stipulating to (and the judge approving) a sentencing range other than 
the one authorized by the guidelines before departing upward.130 
The reasons trial judges do not second guess these upward-departure 
agreements are the same reasons that judges everywhere defer to plea 
agreements.131 There is little incentive for judges to object. And they do not 
 
 129. The U.S. Sentencing Commission adopted “relevant conduct” to reduce the effect that 
charging manipulation by the prosecutor would have on punishment. See, e.g., Ruback & Wroblewski, 
supra note 23, at 749 (“[R]eal offense elements . . . were incorporated into the guidelines as a way to 
see through the prosecutorial charging decision to the actual offense the defendant committed. Because 
prosecutors can, and often do, manipulate the number of charges against a defendant as a way to 
pressure him or her into agreeing to a plea bargain, the guidelines developed rules for reducing 
unfairness that might result from manipulating the number of charges against a defendant.”). The state 
sentencing commissions in both Oregon and Washington also condemn mandatory minimum statutes 
for ceding judicial sentencing authority to prosecutors. See OR. CRIM. JUST. COMM’N, 
LONGITUDINAL M11 STUDY, supra note 126, at 44 (“M11 has combined in the prosecutorial function 
both the charging and the sentencing decision . . . [and] drove more of the sentencing decisions to the 
plea negotiation . . . . If the offender did not accept the proffered plea agreement, the prosecutor 
terminated negotiations and sought conviction at trial, and if a M11 conviction was obtained the 
decision making on the sentence was taken out of the judge’s hands.”); WASH. COMM’N, 2019 REVIEW, 
supra note 30, at 5 (“The SRA took discretion away from the judges, leaving the prosecutors standing 
alone in most cases as the only player with the duty and the authority — and the power — to fashion 
a just result.”).  
 130. Among the reasons for departure noted were the following: “false grid block”; “[a]ctual grid-
block is a 6-C, parties stipulate to a 6-E and an upward dispositional departure to 366 days in the 
Oregon Department of Corrections”; and “[a]ctual grid-block is a 7-H, parties stipulate to a 6-D grid-
block and an upward dispositional departure and 13 months DOC.” On the coding of docket sheets 
from Oregon, see supra note 33. 
 131. See Stephanos Bibas, Prosecutorial Regulation Versus Prosecutorial Accountability, 157 U. PA. L. 
REV. 959, 971–72 (2009) (reviewing why judges are unable to regulate factual representations affecting 
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have to worry about being reversed. Oregon law bars appeal of a departure on 
the ground that it was incorrect or not supported if the sentence was 
stipulated.132 Although Kansas, Minnesota, North Carolina, and Washington 
permit parties to seek review of even a stipulated sentence for procedural 
error,133 appellate courts will not review the sentence itself if the appellant 
agreed to it.134 Not only do judges lack incentives to question the parties’ 
agreements, but there are also strong incentives to accept whatever the parties 
propose, including preserving a favorable reputation for disposing of cases 
quickly.135 
Even if some judges were inclined to check each stipulated sentence or 
departure to ensure it was warranted and had a factual basis, they lack the means 
to do so in some states. Presentence reports that might provide a basis for judges 
to question the parties’ factual stipulations are authorized in each of the five 
states136 but practically unavailable in at least two. In Oregon, presentence 
 
sentencing, including difficulty and cost, the belief that it is “not . . . their job to intervene actively in 
plea bargaining,” and judges’ “strong self-interest in encouraging pleas” to avoid burdening their 
courtrooms with trials); Nancy J. King, Judicial Oversight of Negotiated Sentences in a World of Bargained 
Punishment, 58 STAN. L. REV. 293, 300–01 (2005); Susan R. Klein, Enhancing the Judicial Role in 
Criminal Plea and Sentence Bargaining, 84 TEX. L. REV. 2023, 2028 (2006). 
 132. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 138.105(9), 138.115(7) (Westlaw through laws enacted in the 2020 
Reg. Sess. of the 80th Legis. Assemb.) (“The appellate court has no authority to review any part of a 
sentence resulting from a stipulated sentencing agreement between the state and the defendant.”).  
 133. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-6820(e) (Westlaw through laws enacted during the 2021 Reg. 
Sess. of the Kan. Leg. effective on Apr. 1, 2021); Spann v. State, 704 N.W.2d 486, 494–95 (Minn. 
2005) (affirming a right to appeal even after entering a guilty plea); State v. Watkins, 939 P.2d 1243, 
1244 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997) (“While a defendant normally cannot challenge a presumptive standard 
range sentence, the defendant can challenge the procedure by which a sentence within the standard 
range was imposed.” (citing State v. Ammons, 713 P.2d 719, 724 (Wash. 1986))); see also N.C. GEN. 
STAT. § 15A-1444(a2), (e) (LEXIS through Sess. Laws 2021-6 of the 2021 Reg. Sess. of the Gen. 
Assemb.) (providing for review by petition for writ of certiorari to the intermediate appellate court); 
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.94A.585(7) (LEXIS through chapter 9 of the 2021 Reg. Sess.) (allowing 
Washington State Department of Corrections to challenge an illegal sentence when the parties do not). 
 134. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-6820(c)(2) (Westlaw); State v. Cooper, 394 P.3d 1194, 1196 (Kan. 
Ct. App. 2017) (concluding that an appellate court shall not review a departure sentence resulting from 
an agreement between the state and the defendant when the sentencing court approves it on the record 
and there is no claim that the sentence is illegal); see also Kevin R. Reitz, Comparing Sentencing 
Guidelines: Do US Systems Have Anything Worthwhile To Offer England and Wales?, in SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES: EXPLORING THE ENGLISH MODEL 182, 194 (Andrew Ashworth & Julian V. Roberts 
eds., 2013) (“Upward departures in Minnesota are reversed now and then, but in the absence of legal 
error they are generally treated with deference by the appellate courts.”). Even the MPCS prohibits 
appellate review of a sentence when it was “recommended” by the party appealing, unless it is 
unconstitutional or outside the statutory range for the offense of conviction. MODEL PENAL CODE: 
SENT’G § 10.10(4) (AM. L. INST., forthcoming 2021) (on file with author). Moreover, fact bargaining 
by attorneys receives spotty disciplinary attention at best. See, e.g., Brent E. Newton, Recurring Ethical 
Issues Related to Federal Sentencing, 43 J. LEGAL PROF. 35, 41 (2018) (noting that fact bargaining is not 
unethical in all jurisdictions or contexts). 
 135. See King & Wright, Judicial Participation, supra note 94, at 359–64. 
 136. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-6813 (Westlaw through laws enacted during the 2021 Reg. Sess. of 
the Kan. Leg. effective on Apr. 1, 2021); MINN. STAT. § 609.115 (2020); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1332 
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reports could provide a different version of the facts than what the parties offer, 
but they are apparently uncommon except in sex offenses.137 In Washington, 
since the 2008 recession, presentence reports are reportedly used only for 
offenders convicted of sex crimes or who may be mentally ill.138 The willingness 
to defer to stipulated facts delegates what would otherwise be judicial 
sentencing power to the prosecutor. 
4. Easy for Prosecutors To Establish a Factual Basis for an Upward Departure  
Another reason so many defendants stipulate to aggravating facts for 
upward departures may be that they decide contesting an alleged aggravating 
fact would be futile. Establishing a factual basis for an upward departure takes 
little effort in these states because it requires only one finding to open the 
aggravated range and because many of the most common reasons used for 
upward departure are simple to prove. 
 
(LEXIS through Sess. Laws 2021-6 of the 2021 Reg. Sess. of the Gen. Assemb.); OR. REV. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 137.077, 144.791 (Westlaw through laws enacted in the 2020 Reg. Sess. of the 80th Legis. 
Assemb.); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.94A.500 (LEXIS through chapter 9 of the 2021 Reg. Sess.); 
WASH. SUPER. CT. R. CRIM. P. 7.1 (LEXIS through rules effective through Apr. 1, 2021). The MPCS 
also provides that a presentence report must be produced “in any felony case in which incarceration or 
probation in excess of time served is an option being considered by the court.” MODEL PENAL CODE: 
SENT’G § 10.05(1) & cmt. b (AM. L. INST., forthcoming 2021) (on file with author). For information 
generally about presentence reports, see William H. Pryor Jr., The Integral Role of Federal Probation 
Officers in the Guidelines System, 81 FED. PROB. 13, 15–16, 15 n.25 (2017). 
 137. See King & Wright, Judicial Participation, supra note 94, at 378 & nn.307, 310 (providing 
interviews with Oregon practitioners discussing the use of presentence reports in the state); KING & 
WRIGHT, MANAGERIAL JUDGING, supra note 120, at 28 (collecting input from an Oregon judge, 
prosecutor, and defense attorneys); see also OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 144.791(2) (Westlaw through laws 
enacted in the 2020 Reg. Sess. of the 80th Legis. Assemb.) (discussing mandatory presentence reports 
for felony sex offenses).  
 138. WASH. COMM’N, 2019 REVIEW, supra note 30, at 5 (“The SRA formalized [the stipulated 
sentence] by calling for the parties to draft a plea agreement and to submit that agreement to the court 
prior to sentencing. The judge then determines whether the plea agreement is in the ‘interests of 
justice.’ If the judge finds that it is, the disposition can proceed. Theoretically, a judge could find the 
agreement not just and reject it. However, under current practice, we give a judge no tools beyond the 
representations of the parties to make this determination.”); id. at 5, 15–18 (concluding that 
presumptive sentencing guidelines “took discretion away from the judges, leaving the prosecutors 
standing alone in most cases as the only player with the duty and the authority—and the power—to 
fashion a just result,” and including among recommendations to increase judicial discretion, reduce the 
prosecutor’s ability to control the sentence, and increased access to presentence investigations); Drew, 
supra note 40 (noting that felony presentence investigations are prepared by the DOC, not the superior 
court itself, and that “[i]n the past, [pre-sentence investigations] were requested frequently, but as 
budgets were affected by the recession, requests were limited to those who have been convicted of a 
sex offense or who may be mentally ill” (quoting WASH. STATE SENT’G GUIDELINES COMM’N, PRE-
SENTENCE INVESTIGATION REPORTS PROPOSAL 1 (2019))); see also WASH. SENT’G GUIDELINES 
COMM’N, BLAKELY REPORT, supra note 41, at 12 (“Judges point out that in several large counties judges 
do not have the time or information necessary to determine whether a plea agreement is ‘in the interest 
of justice’ . . . prior to the acceptance of the guilty plea. Thus, in those counties, judges are unable, as 
a practical matter, to exercise their discretion to reject a plea agreement.”). 
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On the first point, compared to tried cases, plea-convicted cases were more 
likely to involve only a single upward-departure factor.139 For a guilty plea, with 
a sentence relatively safe from appellate review, any substantial and compelling 
reason to support an upward departure would do. By contrast, in tried cases, 
appeal is much more likely and there is enough developing case law on what 
findings count as substantial and compelling that prosecutors have good reason 
to seek multiple aggravated findings as insurance against reversal.140 
On the second point, each state offers several easy to prove, frictionless 
options to depart upward.141 For example, proving a crime was committed while 
the defendant was under supervision of some sort, if a state does not already 
consider this within the exception for prior convictions, simply requires proving 
the date of the offense and supervision status at that time. The popular 
aggravators “persistent criminality” and “rapid recidivism” rely primarily on 
criminal history.142 Other easily established upward-departure factors include 
the age or status of a victim, abuse of trust (easy to prove when the defendant 
is a parent or caretaker), multiple victims or incidents per victim, or that the 
crime occurred in the victim’s zone of privacy (home, car, or work).143 
 
 139. For example, in Minnesota, sixty-five percent of plea cases had only one departure reason, 
compared to fifty-two percent of cases that went to trial. Only nine percent of plea cases had three 
departure reasons, compared to twenty-six percent of tried cases. 
 140. E.g., Hosley v. State, No. 27-CR-05-73277, 2012 WL 1069901, at *2–6 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 
2, 2012) (holding that even though one aggravating factor the trial court relied on was impermissible, 
the presence of other aggravating factors from the jury’s findings justified the upward departure in the 
defendant’s sentence); State v. Coleman, 216 P.3d 479, 484–87 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009) (sustaining an 
exceptional sentence in a first-degree robbery case based on a “presence of the victim” aggravator even 
though the court found the consideration of “invasion of privacy” was improper since it is inherent in 
the crime of conviction, thus finding harmless error); see also State v. Ochoa, No. 118,364, 2018 WL 
5091856, at *12–15 (Kan. Ct. App. Oct. 19, 2018) (unpublished table decision) (resulting in the jury 
finding only one of three aggravating factors and that one was legally invalid). 
 141. A list of factors that would support an upward departure is provided in each jurisdiction, but 
only in Washington is that enumerated list exclusive. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.94A.535(3) 
(LEXIS through chapter 9 of the 2021 Reg. Sess.). The other states permit reasons not on the list that 
meet the “substantial and compelling” requirement for departure. See Sentencing Guidelines Resource 
Center, supra note 19 (choose “In-Depth Jurisdiction Profiles”; then choose the relevant state’s 
jurisdiction profile; then choose “Departures and Adjustments to Recommended Sentences” (detailing 
whether that state’s list of upward-departure reasons is exclusive or not)). 
 142. See, e.g., State v. Schenewerk, 174 P.3d 1117, 1118–19 (Or. Ct. App. 2007) (relying on criminal 
history to employ a “‘persistent involvement’ in similar offenses” enhancement); State v. Beggio, 134 
P.3d 1109, 1110 (Or. Ct. App. 2006) (employing a “persistent criminality” departure). In Washington, 
courts may base an upward departure (“exceptional sentence”) on “rapid recidivism.” E.g., State v. 
Bogart, No. 45787-0-I, 2001 WL 508370, at *3 (Wash. Ct. App. May 14, 2001) (involving a crime 
committed less than three months after release); see also State v. Murray, 416 P.3d 1225, 1229–30 
(Wash. 2018) (holding that the rapid recidivism sentencing aggravator was not unconstitutionally 
vague). 
 143. See, e.g., State v. Fields, No. CR-07-60, 2009 WL 982015, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 14, 
2009) (upholding the use of the invasion-of-privacy aggravator where the defendant broke down the 
victim’s apartment door); State v. Gainey, 261 N.C. App. 538, 818 S.E.2d 201, No. COA17-1422, 2018 
WL 4441296, at *1–2 (2018) (unpublished table decision) (upholding the use of the victim’s old age as 
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Additionally, several common mushy aggravators seem readily adaptable if 
needed. A departure can be justified by a finding that the defendant is 
dangerous, not “amenable to probation,”144 demonstrates “lack of remorse,”145 
or caused more than typical harm or loss.146 Indeed, that last reason would 
theoretically fit any case in which an upward departure is exchanged for a charge 
that describes acts less serious than the defendant’s. And as noted earlier, in 
Washington, an “interests of justice” finding insulates any stipulated departure 
from review.147 
To sum up, it appears that except for the small number of cases in which 
the defendant contests the aggravating factor and demands proof before a judge 
or jury, parties regularly use upward departures in ways not anticipated by the 
sentencing guidelines. If prosecutors are concerned that judges will balk at 
jointly engineered sentences, they need only shift their charging strategy to 
pursue their own sentencing preferences and secure sentences that judges have 
no power to reject. The drafters of the MPCS warned that allowing stipulation 
or agreement alone to justify departures “could undermine every systemwide 
policy built into a state’s guidelines, including correctional-resource 
management and the reduction of racial and ethnic disparities in sentencing.”148 
This closer look at cases with stipulated upward departures illustrates how that 
happens, as well as how difficult it would be to control. 
B. Upward Departures in Bargaining—The Policy Debate over Power 
This subsection and the next will examine the claim made by advocates of 
presumptive sentencing guidelines that, compared to mandatory minimum 
 
an aggravating factor); State v. Muhammad, 242 N.C. App. 253, 775 S.E.2d 925, 2015 WL 4081835, 
at *6–7 (2015) (unpublished table decision) (upholding the use of the victims’ young age as an 
aggravating factor); State v. Sullivan, 104 P.3d 636, 638 (Or. Ct. App. 2005) (applying the multiple 
victims aggravating factor); State v. Matthews, No. 41189-0-II, 2013 WL 85326, at *3, *9–10 (Wash. 
Ct. App. Jan. 8, 2013) (discussing the-abuse-of-trust aggravator where a defendant was guilty of first-
degree assault of a child but refusing to apply it simply for procedural reasons). 
 144. State v. Green, 172 P.3d 1213, 1219 (Kan. Ct. App. 2007) (“A sentencing court can rely on a 
jury’s finding that a defendant is not amenable to probation as a substantial and compelling reason to 
either increase the duration of a sentence or make a more restrictive disposition of a sentence or both.”); 
see also State v. Fanning, 208 P.3d 530, 532 (Or. Ct. App. 2009) (affirming the defendant’s conviction 
after finding he had avoided prior opportunities to rehabilitate himself); Departure Report at 2, State 
v. Krueth, No. KX-04-10480, 2006 WL 6549829 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Aug. 2, 2006) (listing as a common 
reason for upward departure that a defendant “[h]as failed on probation/unamenable to probation”).  
 145. E.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.94A.535(3)(q) (LEXIS through chapter 9 of the 2021 Reg. 
Sess.).  
 146. See State v. Hicks, 864 N.W.2d 153, 157 (Minn. 2015) (“Generally, the district court may 
impose an upward durational sentencing departure if the evidence shows that the defendant committed 
the offense in a particularly serious way.”). 
 147. See supra note 106 and accompanying text; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.94A.535(2)(a) 
(LEXIS); In re Breedlove, 979 P.2d 417, 424–25 (Wash. 1999). 
 148. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENT’G § 9.05 cmt. g (AM. L. INST., forthcoming 2021) (on file with 
author); see also id. § 10.03(5) & cmt. g. 
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sentences that follow from proof of an aggravating fact, an upward departure in 
a presumptive-guidelines system preserves more sentencing discretion for 
judges and shifts less sentencing power to prosecutors.149 Are upward-departure 
sentences used like mandatory sentencing statutes, as “bludgeons” to coerce 
pleas?150 Or do judges exercise discretion to undercut prosecutorial departure 
preferences, providing less bargaining leverage to prosecutors than mandatory 
sentencing provisions, which remove judicial discretion entirely?  
To illustrate, assume a mandatory minimum statute provides that any 
defendant convicted of assault must be sentenced to at least eighteen months of 
incarceration if the victim of the assault was over seventy years old. Once the 
prosecutor charges and proves assault, then proves the victim was seventy-eight 
years old, the judge must impose eighteen months. This makes the prosecutor’s 
threat to seek the enhancement quite powerful. Now assume the same case, 
without the enhancement statute, in a presumptive-guidelines system where the 
presumptive range for assault (given the defendant’s criminal history) is capped 
at ten months’ incarceration, and a finding that the victim was seventy-eight 
years old would support an upward departure. This finding would permit a term 
of more than ten months but not require it. The judge would have discretion to 
find that the victim’s age, once established, was not a substantial and compelling 
reason for departing upward in the particular case (say, for example, if the victim 
was—and appeared—extremely fit).151 The prosecutor’s threat to seek an 
upward-departure sentence if the defendant insisted on trial would not 
 
 149. See id. § 6.11 cmts. l–n, reporters’ notes b–c, l; FRASE, JUST SENTENCING, supra note 4, at 
45–48, 57–62. 
 150. Gold, supra note 36 (manuscript at 547); see, e.g., BARKOW, PRISONERS OF POLITICS, supra 
note 36, at 9, 54, 147 (asserting that lumping together binding sentencing guidelines with mandatory 
minimum statutes—without distinguishing between the two—leads to “unchecked abuses” and 
undermines the ability of judges to check prosecutorial overreach); Shawn D. Bushway & Anne M. 
Piehl, Measuring and Explaining Charge Bargaining, 23 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 105, 109–10 
(2007) (discussing hypotheses about how prosecutors choose to charge in a presumptive-guidelines 
system). This has long been a criticism of the use of enhancements by federal prosecutors. E.g., Michael 
A. Simons, Prosecutors as Punishment Theorists: Seeking Sentencing Justice, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 303, 
341 (2009) (criticizing federal prosecutors’ use of “sentencing enhancements” as leverage to extract 
pleas). The drafters of the MPCS worried about this too, warning that prosecutors’ ability to use such 
threats in bargaining “could place great pressure on defendants to plead guilty to charges that overstate 
their criminal behavior, and may coerce innocent defendants to ‘admit’ guilt.” MODEL PENAL CODE: 
SENT’G § 10.03 cmt. g (AM. L. INST., forthcoming 2021) (on file with author). 
 151. On the judge’s discretion to reject a departure despite a factual finding, see KAN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 21-6817(b)(7) (Westlaw through laws enacted during the 2021 Reg. Sess. of the Kan. Leg. effective 
on Apr. 1, 2021); 2019 MINN. GUIDELINES AND COMMENTARY, supra note 82, § 2.D.1 & cmt. 
2.D.102; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.16(a), (b) (LEXIS through Sess. Laws 2021-6 of the 2021 Reg. 
Sess. of the Gen. Assemb.); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 136.785(5) (Westlaw through laws enacted in the 
2020 Reg. Sess. of the 80th Legis. Assemb.); State v. Upton, 125 P.3d 713, 718–19 (Or. 2005) (en banc) 
(“[I]t is the court, not the jury that makes the ultimate decision whether aggravating or mitigating facts 
justify a sentence beyond or below the presumptive range.”); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.94A.537(6) 
(LEXIS through chapter 9 of the 2021 Reg. Sess.); State v. Sage, 407 P.3d 359, 371 (Wash. Ct. App. 
2017) (citing WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.94A.537(6) (LEXIS)). 
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guarantee that a longer sentence would be imposed or how long it would be. 
Moreover, if a judge could initiate an upward departure even without the 
prosecutor’s consent, the prosecutor’s promise not to seek an upward departure 
after a guilty plea would be weaker leverage as well. 
Whether the prosecutor enjoys less leverage with an upward-departure 
provision than a mandatory minimum statute depends upon whether judges in 
presumptive-guidelines systems are willing and able to exercise their discretion 
to upset the prosecution’s predictions. If judges routinely rubber-stamp the 
upward departures that prosecutors seek and do not initiate upward departures 
that prosecutors decline, they relinquish the sentencing discretion that 
presumptive-guidelines systems supposedly protect. A look at how these issues 
are playing out in these presumptive-guidelines states is not encouraging for 
those hoping that the use of upward departures would regulate judicial 
sentencing discretion without shifting it wholesale to the prosecution. 
Starting with the power to initiate upward departures that the prosecutor 
does not seek, only one of the five states grants judges this authority.152 Fifteen 
years ago, the Washington Sentencing Guidelines Commission listed its 
reasons for refusing judges this power: (1) judges “frequently do not have 
sufficient information to make an informed [decision]” before taking a guilty 
plea; (2) even if the judge did have sufficient information, and provided notice 
to the defendant so that they could withdraw his plea, “the result could have a 
considerable disruptive influence on the orderly processing of cases”; and (3) it 
“would improperly impinge upon the province of the prosecuting attorney,” for 
just as judges may not increase the severity of charges, they may not increase 
the severity of the sentence beyond what is “alleged by the prosecutor.”153 
Kansas permits judges to initiate upward departures by giving advance 
notice,154 but available information suggests they rarely do. In only 2 of the 135 
 
 152. North Carolina requires the state to provide notice of any enumerated aggravating factor at 
least thirty days before trial or guilty plea and to include in the indictment any unenumerated basis for 
an aggravated sentence. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.16(a6) (LEXIS). Although a statute appears to 
provide this power in Minnesota, see MINN. STAT. § 631.20 (2020), reportedly the Minnesota Rules 
of Criminal Procedure regarding an aggravated sentence have been interpreted to preclude judges from 
initiating upward departures. See MINN. R. CRIM. P. 27.03 subdiv. 1(B)(3) (Westlaw through 
amendments received through Jan. 1, 2021); see also MINN. R. CRIM. P. 15.01 subdiv. 2(1) (Westlaw) 
(stating that a plea colloquy requires the defendant to “[u]nderstand[] that the prosecutor is seeking a 
sentence greater than the presumptive guideline sentence or an aggravated sentence.” (emphasis 
added)). 
 153. WASH. SENT’G GUIDELINES COMM’N, BLAKELY REPORT, supra note 41, at 22–23. 
 154. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-6817(a)(3) (Westlaw) (“If the court decides to depart on its own 
volition, without a motion from the state or the defendant, the court shall notify all parties of its intent 
and allow reasonable time for either party to respond if requested. The notice shall state the type of 
departure intended by the court and the reasons and factors relied upon.”); KAN. SENT’G COMM’N, 
KANSAS SENTENCING GUIDELINES DESK REFERENCE MANUAL 2016, at 91 (2016); see also MODEL 
PENAL CODE: SENT’G § 10.07(7) (AM. L. INST., forthcoming 2021) (on file with author) (allowing a 
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Kansas cases over the 8-year period in which an upward departure triggered a 
right to a jury factfinding beyond a reasonable doubt did docket sheets or 
appellate documents suggest that the judge initiated the upward departure. 
Some of the same reasons listed by the Washington Sentencing Guidelines 
Commission for denying judges this power may have led judges in Kansas not 
to use it. The end effect on the bargaining power of the prosecutors is the 
same—without judges willing to impose upward departures when prosecutors 
decline to seek them, a prosecutor’s promise not to pursue a departure in return 
for a guilty plea is just as convincing as a promise not to pursue a charge carrying 
a mandatory minimum sentence.155 
C. Upward Departures as Leverage for Pleas in Minnesota 
It is more difficult to test empirically whether a prosecutor’s promise to 
seek an upward departure if the defendant refuses a plea offer is as powerful an 
incentive in bargaining as a promise to seek a mandatory minimum sentence. It 
would require examining cases where prosecutors threatened to seek an upward 
departure but that departure was not imposed. State sentencing commissions do 
not have these data; state sentencing commissions collect information about 
actual, not threatened, sentences. 
Remarkably, however, Minnesota’s courts have for years collected data on 
presentence events concerning upward departures and provided case 
information for all adult felony convictions from 2010 to 2017 that included one 
or more Blakely-related “events,” including whether a notice to seek an upward 
departure had been filed.156 
Combining data on these roughly 2,800 noticed-but-not-imposed cases 
with data on Minnesota’s 5,620 cases where an upward departure had been 
imposed revealed two important patterns in bargaining. 
First, in only three percent of cases convicted by plea with upward-
departure sentences did the prosecutor file a notice to seek an upward 
departure.157 This makes sense if parties use upward-departure sentences 
 
court to raise aggravating fact issues sua sponte so long as the court “allow[s] the parties reasonable 
time to prepare for the proceeding”). 
 155. E.g., State v. Terning, 460 P.3d 382, 384 (Kan. Ct. App. 2020) (“The morning the case was 
set for trial, [the defendant] entered into a plea agreement: [he] would plead no contest to the 
aggravated kidnapping and rape charges; the State would withdraw its upward-departure 
motion . . . .”). 
 156. After adopting rules and procedures for aggravated sentences following Blakely, see MINN. 
STAT. § 244.10 subdiv. 5 (2020), Minnesota’s judicial branch included in its data collection for each 
case information about if and when: (1) a prosecutor filed a notice of intent to seek an upward departure, 
(2) the judge found (or did not find) evidence to support an aggravated departure at the Omnibus 
hearing, (3) a judge ordered a bifurcated or unified trial at the Omnibus hearing, or (4) the defendant 
waived trial on an aggravated factor. A second request for the same variables for cases with upward 
departures imposed revealed no additional Blakely “events” in those cases. 
 157. See infra note 189.  
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primarily at the negotiation stage, to engineer their desired outcomes, as 
described earlier. If the agreed-upon sentence includes an upward departure, 
the requirement that notice be filed in such cases could simply be waived. 
Second and even more important is what the data reveal about cases in 
which the prosecution did file a notice to seek an upward-departure sentence. 
In only 10.5% of such cases was an upward-departure sentence imposed. This 
makes sense if the primary function of providing early notice of the upward 
departure is to secure a plea bargain that avoids that departure. Upward 
departures have this in common with mandatory minimum sentences, which 
prosecutors also use primarily as leverage to secure a trial waiver.158 Like charges 
carrying mandatory minimum sentences, most upward-departure sentences 
appear to be dropped once a plea agreement is reached.159 
Reasons other than bargaining leverage seem less likely to explain why 
nine times out of ten the prosecutor’s formal intent to seek an upward departure 
did not produce a felony conviction with an upward-departure sentence. 
Starting with plea-convicted cases, judicial rejection of the parties’ stipulation to 
an upward departure in a plea-bargained case is not likely to account for a large 
number of cases, for reasons discussed earlier.160 In some of these cases 
prosecutors may have secured guilty pleas to misdemeanors after noticing their 
intent to seek an upward departure for a felony charge,161 which would explain 
their absence in the dataset of felony cases with upward departures provided by 
 
 158. See infra note 169 and accompanying text. 
 159. See, e.g., OR. CRIM. JUST. COMM’N, LONGITUDINAL M11 STUDY, supra note 126, at 41 
(“From 1995-2008, only 28 percent of offenders indicted for a M11 offense were convicted of the most 
serious offense for which a grand jury returned an indictment . . . . [T]he effect of the law was to push 
tough choices about what the sentence should be in an individual case to the executive branch.”); Jeffery 
T. Ulmer, Megan C. Kurlychek & John H. Kramer, Minimum Sentences, Prosecutorial Discretion and the 
Imposition of Mandatory Minimum Sentences, 44 J. RSCH. CRIME & DELINQ. 427, 440 (2007) (finding 
“significant support” for the hypothesis that mandatory-eligible offenders with negotiated plea 
agreements will be less likely to receive mandatory minimums than comparable ones convicted by trial 
in Pennsylvania); Mary Price, Weaponizing Justice: Mandatory Minimums, the Trial Penalty, and the 
Purposes of Punishment, 31 FED. SENT’G REP. 309, 312 (2019); An Offer You Can’t Refuse: How US Federal 
Prosecutors Force Drug Defendants To Plead Guilty, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Dec. 5, 2013), 
https://www.hrw.org/report/2013/12/05/offer-you-cant-refuse/how-us-federal-prosecutors-force-drug 
-defendants-plead# [https://perma.cc/MX63-4UWG] [hereinafter An Offer You Can’t Refuse]; Richard 
A. Oppel Jr., Sentencing Shift Gives New Leverage to Prosecutors, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 25, 2011), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/26/us/tough-sentences-help-prosecutors-push-for-plea-bargains 
.html [https://perma.cc/26RZ-68VC (dark archive)]. 
 160. See supra notes 131–38 and accompanying text. Based on dismissal rates for felony charges in 
large urban counties nationally, a judge’s pretrial dismissal, for a reason other than a plea bargain, of 
the felony charge on which the prosecutor sought to depart before the defendant pled guilty to a 
different felony would account for at most twenty-five percent of the cases. BRIAN A. REAVES, U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUST., FELONY DEFENDANTS IN LARGE URBAN COUNTIES, 2009 - STATISTICAL TABLES 
24 tbl.21 (2013). 
 161. Nationally, about twelve percent of felony charges are resolved as misdemeanors, almost all 
after a guilty plea. REAVES, supra note 160, at 22. 
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the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission. But that would only 
strengthen the conclusion that the threat of upward-departure sentences is 
primarily used as leverage in bargaining. 
Turning to the tried felony cases in Minnesota where notice to seek an 
aggravated sentence was filed but no upward-departure sentence was 
imposed,162 I attempted to determine for each case why that happened. Did the 
judge deny the prosecutor a requested upward departure, or did the upward-
departure sentence fail to materialize for some other reason? Given the routine 
use of easy-to-establish aggravating facts,163 judges probably did not often find 
that there was insufficient evidence that an aggravating fact existed. Nor were 
they likely to have rejected a fact—especially one found by a jury—as 
insufficiently substantial or compelling to justify an aggravated sentence.164 Yet 
based on the eighty-one tried cases with adequate information to explain the 
absence of an upward-departure sentence the prosecutor had noticed, I found 
that, in fourteen of those cases, the judge had declined to impose an upward-
departure sentence after an aggravated fact was established.165 If the same 
pattern was present in the cases that were missing information,166 it would 
suggest that once an aggravated fact is proven at trial, the odds that a judge will 
decline an upward departure the prosecutor seeks are about one in eight.167 This 
is admittedly speculative, but if it approximates what defendants believe, 
defendants in Minnesota may proceed to trial with more hope of avoiding an 
 
 162. Using “jury trial held” or “court trial held” variables for each of the 198 cases where notice 
had been filed but no data from the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission received, I 
reviewed the docket sheet and any appellate opinion available (seventy-five percent of these tried cases 
were appealed, mostly conviction-only challenges) and searched news reports. Six were guilty pleas, 
not trials; three were consolidated, duplicating other cases; and nine others actually did have upward-
departure sentences but were not in the data sent from the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines 
Commission. The cases were spread between thirty-four counties. 
 163. See supra Section III.A.4. 
 164. In Washington, “the jury’s finding in itself provides the trial court with a substantial and 
compelling reason to impose such a sentence.” State v. Perry, 431 P.3d 543, 549 (Wash. Ct. App. 2018). 
 165. In half of these rejection cases, the jury found the aggravating fact, and in the other seven the 
judge had. In some of these rejection cases, judges opted for top-of-range sentences or consecutive 
sentences authorized without upward departure under section 609.035(6) of the Minnesota Statutes. 
See MINN. STAT. § 609.035 subdiv. 6 (2020). 
The other sixty-seven cases where there was no upward departure despite the prosecutor’s pursuit 
of one were cases in which the judge could not have imposed an upward departure: eleven murder 
convictions to mandatory life-without-parole, twelve cases with misdemeanor convictions only, three 
cases where the judge rejected the aggravating factor before trial, three where the jury acquitted the 
defendant of the felony associated with the upward departure, thirty-seven cases in which the 
aggravated fact was never submitted to the factfinder for various other reasons, and just one where the 
jury considered and rejected the aggravated fact. 
 166. Unfortunately, for only forty-five percent (eighty-one) of these cases was it possible to 
determine from available information if an aggravating factor was even considered by the judge or jury. 
 167. This is assuming that in thirty-one (seventeen percent) of all 180 cases the judge declined to 
impose an upward-departure sentence despite a finding, compared to 234 cases that went to trial and 
ended in departure sentences. 
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upward departure than the zero percent chance of avoiding a mandatory 
minimum sentence upon proof of a triggering fact. At least in Minnesota, where 
judges have occasionally exercised their discretion to reject upward departures 
after trial, upward departures are a somewhat less potent “trial penalty.” 
These unique data from Minnesota also suggest that prosecutors use the 
notice of intent to seek an upward departure primarily as leverage to negotiate 
a plea bargain that does not include that upward departure.168 This use of 
upward-departure notices resembles how prosecutors use charges carrying 
mandatory minimum sentences in bargaining: most are threatened, then 
dropped by the prosecutor, and the defendant need not fear imposition by the 
judge once a plea agreement is reached.169 Only in the small percentage of cases 
that go to trial is there reason to credit the claim that judges retain more power 
over departures in a presumptive-guidelines system than they do under 
mandatory minimum sentencing statutes.  
*    *    * 
Part II presented the various policy choices and legal rulings that define 
the parameters of cases subject to the procedural requirements of Blakely—a 
cautionary tale for those states considering designing their own presumptive-
guidelines system. The patterns revealed in Part III suggest that departures do 
“tend to cluster in predictable ways,” allowing state sentencing commissions to 
accurately predict the resources needed to accommodate policy changes, as the 
MPCS asserts.170 But it is less clear, at least as to upward departures, that the 
MPCS is correct that under presumptive sentencing guidelines, “judicial 
sentencing decisions within the superstructure of guidelines are the main 
determinants of a state’s prison policy.”171 Rather, it appears to be the 
sentencing decisions of prosecutors, through charging and bargaining, that 
determine these predictable patterns. 
In four of the five states, judges have no power to seek a departure that 
the prosecutor declines to seek, and in Kansas, judges use that power rarely. 
And when a prosecutor or both parties do seek an upward-departure sentence, 
judges in several states lack the tools or incentives they would need to reject it. 
This leaves prosecutors free to use departures like they use mandatory 
minimum and sentencing-enhancement statutes—as leverage to secure pleas. 
 
 168. Additionally, prosecutors use the notice of intent to discourage other actions. See State v. 
McGinley, No. 119,781, 2019 WL 3850605, at *9 (Kan. Ct. App. Aug. 16, 2019) (per curiam) 
(unpublished table decision) (“[T]he State’s purpose in advising McGinley of its intent to withdraw 
its latest plea offer and consider moving for an upward departure if McGinley proceeded to discharge 
his attorney was to prevent delaying the trial which was only three days away.”). 
 169. See supra notes 152, 159 and accompanying text. 
 170. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENT’G § 8.07 cmt. a (AM. L. INST., forthcoming 2021) (on file with 
author). 
 171. Id. (emphasis added). 
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Further, the findings from some states suggest that the parties use upward 
departures in ways that are unrelated or even contrary to presumptive 
sentencing guidelines’ goals of proportionality, uniformity, and transparency.172 
Prosecutors need not consider these goals when negotiating, and defense 
counsel are bound to advance client goals, not state-sentencing policy. Instead 
of restricting upward departures to cases that are “outside the realm of an 
ordinary case within the class of cases defined in the guidelines,”173 a significant 
portion of upward departures routinely facilitate more leniency to defendants 
than they may otherwise receive had there been no upward departure 
available.174 
Finally, it is important to consider how the bargaining patterns revealed 
here have the potential to distort sentencing policy. As Kelly Lyn Mitchell, 
Executive Director of the Robina Institute of Criminal Law and Criminal 
Justice, Chair of the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission, and 
former President of the National Association of Sentencing Commissions, has 
explained, one of the two fundamental reasons for a sentencing commission to 
collect and report departure data is “so that it can serve as a feedback loop for 
the commission and state legislature.”175 It exposes “patterns and trends in 
sentencing practices over time,” that might in turn reveal “offenses for which 
the courts regularly impose departures, and such information is a signal that the 
criminal justice system is dissatisfied with the recommended sentences under 
the guidelines, or the laws for which the sentences are recommended, or 
both.”176 To the extent policymakers and courts rely on departure data when 
identifying the “typical” sentence appropriate for a given charge, or to evaluate 
departure reasons, these negotiated resolutions may distort those decisions. 
Pleas to lesser offenses with upward departures to avoid a higher charge, “false 
grid blocks” (fictitious presumptive ranges),177 and stipulated aggravating facts 
skew the empirical picture. They undermine what state sentencing commissions 
tout as one of their most valuable attributes: accurate data needed for evidence-
 
 172. E.g., State v. Barthman, 938 N.W.2d 257, 269–70 (Minn. 2020) (“The purpose of the 
Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines ‘is to establish rational and consistent sentencing standards which 
reduce sentencing disparity and ensure that sanctions following conviction of a felony are proportional 
to the severity of the offense of conviction and the extent of the offender’s criminal history . . . . To 
maintain uniformity and proportionality, departures from the presumptive guidelines sentence are 
discouraged.’” (citation omitted) (quoting State v. Jackson, 749 N.W.2d 353, 357 (Minn. 2008))). 
 173. See MODEL PENAL CODE: SENT’G §§ 10.01(2)(a), 10.07 cmt. h (AM. L. INST., forthcoming 
2021) (on file with author); see also State v. Hayden, 449 P.3d 445, 447 (Kan. Ct. App. 2019) (“[A] 
sentencing departure must be supported by substantial and compelling reasons justifying a deviation 
from the presumptive guidelines sentence . . . . ‘Compelling’ means that the court is forced, by the facts 
of the case, to leave the status quo or go what is beyond ordinary.”). 
 174. See supra Section III.A.2. 
 175. Mitchell, supra note 19, at 35. 
 176. Id. 
 177. See supra notes 120, 130 and accompanying text. 
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based sentencing policy. Charge and sentence bargaining and the fictions they 
perpetuate are ubiquitous and certainly not limited to presumptive-guidelines 
systems.178 Indeed they might be even more prevalent in states without 
presumptive sentencing guidelines. Nevertheless, understanding the extent and 
nature of bargaining that produces sentencing data better equips consumers of 
that information to interpret it. 
IV. NOTICE, WAIVER, BIFURCATION, AND RETRIAL: THE PROCEDURAL 
CONSEQUENCES OF LESS-THAN-FULL-ELEMENT STATUS 
Four additional aspects of the adjudication of upward departures in 
presumptive-guidelines states deserve attention, each related to the refusal to 
treat aggravating facts as elements instead of sentencing factors: (1) the 
provision of notice to the defendant of any aggravating factor that would 
warrant an elevated sentence minimum or maximum, (2) waiver of the right to 
demand that factor be proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, (3) 
bifurcation—separate consideration by the factfinder of the aggravating factor 
only after a finding of guilt on the other elements of the offense, and (4) the 
handling of aggravating factors after remand from a successful appeal. In some 
of these states, the procedural protections regarding notice, waiver, and post-
appeal adjudication are not as exacting as they would be if the fact authorizing 
a more severe penalty was treated as an element of the crime for all purposes. 
This more relaxed approach has potential advantages for states seeking to tie 
higher punishment ranges to the presence of aggravating facts beyond those 
defined as part of the offense. But those advantages are also contingent upon 
the continued legality of these practices. 
A. Notice 
Ordinarily in these states, if the legislature had defined a lesser and greater 
offense so that guilt of the greater offense depended upon the existence of a 
particular fact, then that fact, as an element of the greater offense, would be 
included in the charging instrument so that the defendant would know which 
charges they were facing.179 None of the five presumptive-guidelines states 
 
 178. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 127, at 897, 899–900 (collecting fictional pleas in multiple 
jurisdictions and noting how they “slant the data about what sorts of crimes are being committed and 
by whom”); Brown, supra note 126, at 36–37. 
 179. See State v. Serstock, 402 N.W.2d 514, 518 (Minn. 1987) (“[T]he indictment must contain 
the elements of the offense charged.”); State v. Oldroyd, 271 N.C. App. 544, 545, 843 S.E.2d 478, 479 
(2020) (“Indictments must state all essential and necessary elements of an offense in order to bestow 
the trial court with jurisdiction.”); State v. Haji, 462 P.3d 1240, 1255 (Or. 2020) (“[T]o show that a 
crime has been committed, it is essential for a grand jury indictment to include the facts supporting 
the elements of the crime . . . .”); State v. McCarty, 998 P.2d 296, 299 (Wash. 2000) (en banc) (“It is 
a well-settled rule that a charging document satisfies . . . constitutional principles only if it states all 
the essential elements of the crime charged, both statutory and nonstatutory.”); State v. Brett, 892 
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require the state to include any aggravating fact needed for an upward-
departure sentence in the charges. Instead, each state requires the prosecution 
to provide notice before trial or plea.180 In Kansas, however, the court can decide 
on its own to depart upward after conviction, so long as it provides reasonable 
time for the parties to prepare before the sentencing hearing.181 The MPCS, 
too, provides that a prosecutor, with good cause, could seek a departure after the 
defendant has been convicted.182 
 
P.2d 29, 39 (Wash. 1995) (en banc) (recognizing that Washington’s constitution, as well as the U.S. 
Constitution, “require an information to include all statutory and common law elements of the crimes 
charged”). But see State v. Dunn, 375 P.3d 332, 359–60 (Kan. 2016) (“A charging document’s failure 
to include an element of a crime under the defining Kansas statute does not . . . necessarily meet the 
statute-defined threshold for failure to charge a crime because the facts alleged, rather than the legal 
elements regurgitated, determine whether the charge is sufficient under the statute defining the 
crime.”). 
For the other fact-based, range-raising devices—mandatory minimum and enhancement 
statutes—sometimes states insist they be included in the charge, sometimes not. In Kansas, for example, 
the sentence enhancements based on specified factfinding sometimes state that the factfinder must 
determine the triggering fact, in which case the fact is included in the charging instrument and 
submitted to the jury along with the other elements. Other enhancements or mandatory minimum facts 
are found separately in a special verdict, after a general verdict on the other elements. In Minnesota, 
facts triggering mandatory minimums, such as possession of a firearm, need not be included in the 
charge. But see State v. Hugdahl, 458 P.3d 760, 763 (Wash. 2020) (“Sentencing enhancements must be 
alleged in the information because they increase the sentence beyond the prescribed statutory 
maximum.”). 
 180. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-6817(b)(1) (Westlaw through laws enacted during the 2021 Reg. 
Sess. of the Kan. Leg. effective on Apr. 25, 2021) (requiring a motion to seek an upward durational 
departure sentence not less than thirty days prior to the date of trial); MINN. STAT. § 244.10 subdiv. 
5 (2020) (stating that a prosecutor must provide “reasonable notice” of intent to seek aggravated 
sentence); MINN. R. CRIM. P. 7.03 (Westlaw) (explaining that notice of grounds and factual basis 
supporting aggravated sentence must be provided at least seven days before Omnibus hearing or later 
if permitted by the court on good cause and on conditions that will not unfairly prejudice the 
defendant); MINN. R. CRIM. P. 15.01 subdiv. 2 (Westlaw through amendments received through Jan. 
1, 2021) (requiring a judge to advise a defendant of an upward departure before pleading guilty); State 
v. Sawatzky, 125 P.3d 722, 727 (Or. 2005) (rejecting the need to include enhancement factors in the 
indictment); see also WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.94A.537(1) (LEXIS through chapter 9 of the 2021 
Reg. Sess.) (“At any time prior to trial or entry of the guilty plea if substantial rights of the defendant 
are not prejudiced, the state may give notice that it is seeking a sentence above the standard sentencing 
range.”); State v. Edwards, 261 N.C. App. 459, 472, 820 S.E.2d 862, 872 (2018) (explaining that the 
statute requires written notice of intent to prove aggravating factors at least thirty days before trial or 
plea). There is one exception. North Carolina requires that the prosecutor include in the charging 
instrument any upward-departure factors not enumerated in the statute. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-
1340.16(a4), (a6) (LEXIS through Sess. Laws 2021-6 of the 2021 Reg. Sess. of the Gen. Assemb.) 
(explaining that any nonenumerated aggravating factor must be included in an indictment or other 
charging instrument, but for factors enumerated in the statute, the state need only provide written 
notice at least thirty days before trial or the entry of a guilty or no contest plea). 
 181. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-6817(a) (Westlaw through laws enacted during the 2021 Reg. Sess. of 
the Kan. Leg. effective on Apr. 25, 2021) (“If the court decides to depart on its own volition, without 
a motion from the state or the defendant, the court shall notify all parties of its intent and allow 
reasonable time for either party to respond if requested.”). 
 182. See MODEL PENAL CODE: SENT’G § 10.07 cmt. c (AM. L. INST., forthcoming 2021) (on file 
with author) (explaining that “§ 10.07 does not treat jury-sentencing facts as elements of offenses” 
99 N.C. L. REV. 1241 (2021) 
2021] HANDLING AGGRAVATING FACTS AFTER BLAKELY 1287 
By treating aggravating facts differently than other elements for purposes 
of notice, these states are running some risk that the Supreme Court may later 
find that approach violates a defendant’s constitutional right to notice of the 
charge.183 The Court might reject the premise that a fact can be an element for 
some purposes but not for others,184 and conclude that belated notice of this 
element comes too late when not provided until after conviction.185 A state is 
on shaky ground if it relies on legislative intent to treat the fact as a sentencing 
factor rather than an element186 after the Court has expressly rejected that 
rationale.187 
Speculation about the long-term viability of this approach aside, it is clear 
that treating a departure factor as something less than an element for purposes 
of notice is helpful to the state. It obviates the need to include an allegation of 
the departure factor in the initial charge or in the elements to be screened by 
preliminary hearing or grand jury. The Washington Supreme Court, for 
example, explained that “treating aggravators as the functional equivalent of 
essential elements that must be pleaded in the charging document is harmful to 
the public interest because it wastes valuable judicial resources and imposes too 
heavy a burden on the criminal justice system.”188 
 
because requiring these allegations in the charging instrument would “impose heavy new burdens on 
prosecutors”). The MPCS “suggests 20 days before trial as a feasible deadline for all parties in most 
cases” but explains that where “the government may become aware of important sentencing 
considerations shortly before trial, during the trial, or shortly afterward,” courts may “permit notice of 
jury-sentencing facts later than normally envisioned,” so long as the defendant is allowed “reasonable 
time to prepare for the proceeding at which the existence of a jury-sentencing fact will be determined.” 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 183. See generally LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 13, § 19.2(c) (discussing the Sixth Amendment’s 
notice requirement). 
 184. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENT’G § 10.07 cmt. c (AM. L. INST., forthcoming 2021) (on file with 
author) (“The Supreme Court has held that jury-sentencing facts are the ‘functional equivalent’ of 
elements of offenses for purposes of the Sixth Amendment jury-trial guarantee, but the Court has never 
held that they are elements of offenses for other purposes.”). 
 185. See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 13, § 19.3 (collecting cases discussing whether the essential 
elements requirement is based in the Sixth Amendment). States are not bound by the Fifth 
Amendment’s Grand Jury Clause, which does require grand jury screening of every element. Hurtado 
v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 534–35 (1884); see also State v. Marshall, 334 P.3d 866, 875 (Kan. Ct. App. 
2014) (finding that the notice provisions of section 21-6817 of the Kansas Statutes comport with the 
Sixth Amendment as they “require[] the State to provide notice that it intends to seek an upward 
sentencing departure and to provide information to the court regarding ‘the alleged fact or factors that 
may increase the penalty’ no less than 30 days prior to trial, or 7 days from the arraignment if the trial 
is to take place in less than 30 days”). 
 186. See, e.g., State v. Reinke, 309 P.3d 1059, 1062, 1073 (Or. 2013) (holding that under state and 
federal constitutions, the legislature defines the elements of the offense that must be pled in an 
indictment and, as a matter of legislative intent, a crime does not include sentence enhancement facts). 
 187. See Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 306–07 (2004). 
 188. State v. Siers, 274 P.3d 358, 363–64 (Wash. 2012) (holding that neither the state nor federal 
constitution requires aggravators to be alleged in an information, and that notice prior to trial was 
sufficient). 
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The information about notice collected from available data, docket sheets, 
and appellate documents in Minnesota, Kansas, and Oregon underscores what 
a drastic change it would be to require that the state allege upward departure 
factors in the charging document. A motion or other formal notice alleging an 
aggravating fact was often missing entirely—particularly in cases resolved by 
plea. In ninety-five percent of cases in which upward departures were imposed 
in Minnesota, prosecutors never filed a notice of the intent to seek such a 
departure with the required factual allegations.189 In Oregon, where an upward 
departure is requested by motion, these motions were filed in only an estimated 
thirteen percent of upward-departure cases.190 In Kansas, fifty-five percent of 
the 114 upward durational departure cases that were resolved by plea had notices 
docketed,191 but notices were often filed the same day as the plea agreement 
when the departure was part of the deal. The lack of prior notice in so many 
cases with upward-departure sentences is consistent with the bargaining 
patterns noted earlier. If most upward departures are imposed at the request of 
the defendant or exchanged for a charge or sentencing concession from the state, 
the possibility of an upward departure may not even surface until negotiations 
take shape, such that any notice requirements would be routinely waived. 
Treating every aggravating factor as an element of a greater offense might 
require the state to secure an amended charge before a defendant could admit 
the factor if a simple waiver was not available.192 Or it might prompt prosecutors 
to include allegations of aggravating factors in charging documents for more 
cases, a development that may further increase the pressure to plead guilty for 
some defendants in order to avoid the departure. Alleging every aggravating 
factor in the charges may also require abandoning some potential factors that 
may not be clear at the outset of a case, such as lack of remorse or failing to 
abide by conditions of pretrial release. 
B. Waiver 
A second consequence of treating an aggravating factor as something less 
than an element is that it may be easier for a prosecutor to secure a defendant’s 
 
 189. A felony case receiving an upward-departure sentence was nine times more likely to have had 
notice if it went to trial—thirty-six percent of the upward-departure cases with conviction by trial had 
notice compared to only four percent of the pleas, and only three percent of the plea cases where the 
defendant agreed to the upward-departure sentence. 
 190. This rate varied between counties. For example, among counties with more than twenty 
upward-departure cases coded, see supra note 33 (regarding coding of Oregon cases), the rate at which 
a motion or notice was filed ranged from zero to twenty-two percent. In Oregon, half or more of the 
trial cases had motions, compared to less than twenty percent of the plea-convicted cases. 
 191. Notice was evident in a higher percentage of the jury-tried cases—sixteen of the nineteen 
upward durational departure cases that went to trial. 
 192. See, e.g., MINN. R. CRIM. P. 15.08 (Westlaw through amendments received through Jan. 1, 
2021). 
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waiver of trial on that factor than it is to secure a knowing and voluntary waiver 
of trial on the elements of the underlying offense. For the elements of the 
underlying offense, guilty plea colloquies between the judge and the defendant 
are scripted by court rule and case law to ensure that the record confirms 
defendant’s understanding of the charge, sentence, and rights waived.193 In 
Minnesota, Kansas, and North Carolina, a defendant must complete a separate 
colloquy, similar to a guilty plea colloquy, to waive trial on a factor supporting 
an upward-departure sentence.194 Yet courts in Washington and Oregon have 
upheld waivers of trial on aggravating facts despite the absence of a formal 
guilty plea colloquy like that required for the other elements of an offense.195 
This means that upward departures may provide more flexibility to the 
prosecution than other fact-based, range-raising options that must be included 
in a single guilty plea colloquy. 
C. Bifurcation 
The assumption in these states that the aggravating factor supporting an 
upward departure is not an element of the conviction has led to not only a 
bifurcated and less formal plea process, but also a bifurcated trial process. This, 
too, differs from the procedure that would apply if these aggravating factors 
were treated as elements. 
Typically, separate jury consideration of an aggravating element that 
separates a lesser offense from a greater offense is limited to particularly 
 
 193. See generally LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 13, § 21.4. 
 194. MINN. R. CRIM. P. 15.01 (Westlaw) (setting out advisements for waiving trial on aggravating 
sentence that mirror advisements for waiving trial); State v. Bennett, 347 P.3d 229, 235 (Kan. Ct. App. 
2015) (holding that because waiver was not in accordance with section 21-6817(b)(4) of the Kansas 
Statutes, a judicial factfinding for upward departure was invalid when the defendant was never advised 
on the record of her right to have the aggravating factors determined by a unanimous jury beyond a 
reasonable doubt, and did not waive that right, either orally or in writing); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-
1022.1(c) (LEXIS through Sess. Laws 2021-6 of the 2021 Reg. Sess. of the Gen. Assemb.). But see State 
v. Everette, 361 N.C. 646, 655–56, 652 S.E.2d 241, 246–48 (2007) (“[Although] North Carolina’s 
Blakely Act now require[s] the trial court to address defendants personally, advise them that they are 
entitled to a jury trial on any aggravating factors, and ensure that an admission is the result of an 
informed choice. . . . [D]efense counsel’s admissions to the existence of an aggravating factor constitute Blakely-
compliant admissions upon which an aggravated sentence may be imposed.” (emphasis added)); State v. 
Satterwhite, 262 N.C. App. 374, 820 S.E.2d 135, No. COA18-249, 2018 WL 5796371, at *4 
(unpublished table decision) (2018) (advising, “strongly,” that courts follow the colloquy). 
 195. See State v. Lafferty, 247 P.3d 1266, 1276–78 (Or. Ct. App. 2011) (noting that enhancement 
facts must be tried to the jury during the guilt phase unless the court defers trial of such facts to the 
sentencing phase or the defendant “makes a written waiver of the right to a jury trial on the 
enhancement fact” and either “[a]dmits to the enhancement fact” or “[e]lects to have the enhancement 
fact tried to the court”); see also State v. Trebilcock, 341 P.3d 1004, 1010–11 (Wash. Ct. App. 2014); 
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.94A.537(3) (LEXIS through chapter 6 of the 2021 Reg. Sess.) (noting 
defendant’s stipulation is sufficient). 
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prejudicial elements, such as those involving criminal history.196 Lesser and 
greater offenses separated by a single element—such as different degrees of a 
crime like theft, assault, or homicide—are submitted to the jury together when 
the defendant contests the aggravating element.197 Courts do not ask juries to 
find whether the defendant is guilty of the lesser offense, and then—only later, 
at a separate proceeding or in a special verdict—ask the jury to find whether the 
prosecution has met its burden of proof on the element required for the greater 
offense. Instead, the defendant is entitled to a general verdict of guilt or 
innocence on each charge.198 
States that adopted presumptive sentencing guidelines before Blakely did 
not anticipate that facts needed for upward departures would be adjudicated as 
elements of greater offenses. Rather, the determination of aggravating factors 
for upward departures was to take place at the sentencing phase, following a 
finding of guilt of the underlying offense and the preparation of a presentencing 
report.199 When Blakely was announced, the prospect of sequencing separate jury 
trials, instructions, or verdicts for upward-departure factors was not welcome.200 
Bifurcation could take additional time, require new jury instructions, complicate 
voir dire, and create additional litigation. Indeed, the Blakely dissenters warned 
of this added burden.201 
Recognizing that some aggravating factors might be prejudicial to a jury’s 
consideration of guilt on the underlying offense,202 all five states examined here 
 
 196. See, e.g., Nancy J. King, Juries and Prior Convictions: Managing the Demise of the Prior Conviction 
Exception to Apprendi, 67 SMU L. REV. 577, 586–87 (2014). 
 197. See, e.g., State v. Miller, 427 P.3d 907, 930 (Kan. 2018) (rejecting defendant’s challenge to 
judge’s refusal to bifurcate murder trial, so that in the “first phase, the jury would determine whether 
the State had proved, beyond a reasonable doubt, that [the victim’s] death was a homicide” and, at a 
second trial, “determine the degree of homicide that had been committed”). 
 198. United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 513–14 (1995). Some jurisdictions do require judges 
to instruct juries to decide guilt or innocence of the highest charge before moving to the lesser charge, 
in part to avoid “uncertainty about whether retrial of the greater offense would be barred by the Double 
Jeopardy Clause.” See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 13, § 24.8(d) & nn.54–58 (discussing acquittal-first 
jurisdictions); Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, When Should Jury’s Deliberation Proceed from Charged Offense to 
Lesser-Included Offense, 26 A.L.R.5th 603, § 3 (1995) (discussing acquittal-first instructions). But I am 
not aware of any jurisdictions that require the jury to deliver its verdict on the lesser charge before 
considering the greater charge. 
 199. See, e.g., Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 299–300 (2004) (describing Washington’s 
approach before announcing the decision). 
 200. See, e.g., supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
 201. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 336 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (warning of the costs of bifurcation); see also 
Oregon v. Ice, 555 U.S. 160, 172 (2009) (declining to extend Apprendi to the factfinding required for 
consecutive sentences, noting that otherwise, “bifurcated or trifurcated trials might often prove 
necessary” and stating, “We will not so burden the Nation’s trial courts absent any genuine affront to 
Apprendi’s instruction”); id. at 177 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (characterizing the Court’s warning of 
bifurcated and trifurcated trials as “another déjà vu and déjà rejeté; we have watched it parade past 
before, in several of our Apprendi-related opinions, and have not saluted”). 
 202. See, e.g., J.J. Prescott & Sonja Starr, Improving Criminal Jury Decision Making After the Blakely 
Revolution, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 301, 304. For example, consider State v. Warren, 98 P.3d 1129, 1132, 
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authorized bifurcated jury trials for upward departures203 as well as special 
verdicts.204 A defendant could also waive their right to a trial on the aggravating 
fact altogether after being convicted of the underlying offense,205 or waive the 
jury trial and opt for a bench trial on the aggravating factor.206 Perpetuating this 
approach, the MPCS terms these “jury-sentencing facts,” and posits that the 
jury will “return a special verdict on a question of fact during sentencing 
proceedings.”207 
Just how frequent and burdensome has bifurcation been in these 
presumptive-guidelines states? Justice Breyer, dissenting in Blakely, observed 
that the majority’s holding appeared to count on plea bargaining to ensure that 
the burden was workable, as “more than 90% of defendants will not go to trial 
even once, much less insist on two or more trials.”208 His prediction was close. 
In four of the five states, more than ninety-six percent of defendants with 
 
1135 (Or. Ct. App. 2004) (agreeing with defendant’s argument that he had a right to a jury 
determination of the dangerous-offender aggravator based on a fact not pled in the indictment and 
proved to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt, namely, the fact that he was “suffering from a ‘severe 
personality disorder indicating a propensity toward crimes that seriously endanger the life or safety of 
another’” (quoting OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 161.725(1)(a) (Westlaw through laws enacted in the 2020 
Reg. Sess. of the 80th Leg. Assemb.))), and State v. Angilda, No. 106,226, 2013 WL 1234188, at *8–11 
(Kan. Ct. App. Mar. 22, 2013) (per curiam) (describing a bifurcated trial where the jury found the 
defendant presented a risk of future dangerousness). Unfortunately, information was too incomplete 
to reliably determine if bifurcated cases were associated with departure reasons that may have been 
considered prejudicial at a unitary trial. 
 203. See, e.g., MINN. R. CRIM. P. 11.04 subdiv. 2(b) (Westlaw through amendments received 
through Jan. 1, 2021) (stating that bifurcation is required “if the evidence supporting an aggravated 
sentence includes evidence otherwise inadmissible at the guilt phase of the trial or if that evidence 
would unfairly prejudice the defendant in the guilt phase”); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-6817(b)(1)–(2), (4) 
(Westlaw through laws enacted during the 2021 Reg. Sess. of the Kan. Leg. effective on Apr. 1, 2021); 
MINN. STAT. § 244.10, subdiv. 5(c) (2020); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.16(a1) (LEXIS through 
Sess. Laws 2021-6 of the 2021 Reg. Sess. of the Gen. Assemb.); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 136.770(1), 
(4) (Westlaw through laws enacted in the 2020 Reg. Sess. of the 80th Legis. Assemb.); WASH. REV. 
CODE ANN. § 9.94A.537(4) (LEXIS through chapter 9 of the 2021 Reg. Sess.).  
 204. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-6817(b)(7) (Westlaw); MINN. STAT. § 244.10, subdiv. 5(b); MINN. 
R. CRIM. P. 11.04, subdiv. (2) (Westlaw); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.94A.537(3) (LEXIS). 
 205. E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1022.1 (LEXIS through Sess. Laws 2021-6 of the 2021 Reg. 
Sess. of the Gen. Assemb.) (“A defendant may admit to the existence of an aggravating factor or to the 
existence of a prior record level point under G.S. 15A-1340.14(b)(7) before or after the trial of the 
underlying felony.”). 
 206. See State v. Hayden, 364 P.3d 962, 966 (Kan. Ct. App. 2015) (discussing amended statute 
that since 2011 has read, “If the jury at the upward durational departure sentence proceeding has been 
waived, the upward durational departure sentence proceeding shall be conducted by the court” (quoting 
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-6817(b)(4) (Westlaw))). In North Carolina, however, where the state 
constitution was only recently amended to allow bench trials, the statute regulating trials of aggravating 
factors continues to say that if contested by the defendant, “only a jury may determine if an aggravating 
factor is present in an offense.” N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.16(a1) (LEXIS). 
 207. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENT’G §§ 6.02 cmt. b, 10.07 (AM. L. INST., forthcoming 2021) (on 
file with author) (emphasis added). 
 208. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 337 (2004) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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upward-departure sentences plead guilty.209 Based on available information 
from Oregon and Kansas, it appears that at least eighty percent of defendants 
who pled guilty also admitted the aggravating fact and opted not to have the 
judge determine the fact beyond a reasonable doubt.210 
For the small percentage of upward-departure cases that were not settled 
by plea, a different picture emerged. Some information about bifurcation 
practices could be found in the docket sheets and available appellate documents 
in Kansas, Oregon, and Minnesota.211 This limited information revealed that 
many defendants receiving an upward-departure sentence after being convicted 
at trial had admitted or stipulated to the aggravating fact—this included one in 
four of such defendants in Minnesota, for example.212 For defendants who 
contested the aggravating fact, bifurcated adjudication was quite common. In 
Kansas, eighty-nine percent of the upward-departure cases where juries 
returned guilty verdicts were bifurcated into separate phases.213 In Minnesota, 
between thirty-five percent and sixty-four percent of jury trials in upward-
departure cases were bifurcated.214 In Oregon, roughly half of jury-tried cases 
with upward departures were bifurcated.215 Notably, bifurcation did not always 
mean a separate jury decision; defendants often opted for the judge rather than 
 
 209. See supra note 98 and accompanying text (displaying Table 4). 
 210. In Kansas, the aggravating fact was admitted in 80.7% of cases, the fact was found at a bench 
trial after the plea in 4.4% of cases, and for the remaining 15% of cases this could not be determined. 
Among Oregon’s cases of upward departure after a plea, of the 58% of cases where this could be 
determined, the defendant would usually—88% of the time—agree to the aggravating fact as well. 
 211. Minnesota data also included, of the roughly 2,800 cases with a notice to seek an upward 
departure but no departure imposed, 25 cases with a pretrial finding supporting a bifurcated trial and 4 
with a pretrial finding regarding a unified trial. (Judges need only make such findings pretrial if the 
Omnibus hearing at which they must be made is not waived by the defendant. MINN. R. CRIM. P. 
11.01, 11.04 subdiv. 2 (Westlaw through amendments received through Jan. 1, 2021).) Because these 
novel “Blakely events” may have been docketed over the years with less consistency, I gathered what 
information I could from docket sheets and appellate documents as well. 
 212. Admissions or stipulations to the aggravating fact appeared in twenty percent of the jury trials 
and six percent of the bench trials.  
 213. In eight years, there were eighteen jury trial convictions where the defendant was sentenced 
to an upward durational departure (the only type of departure that carries a right to a jury finding in 
that state), and sixteen of those were bifurcated jury proceedings. One of the sixteen jury-conviction 
cases involved a bench finding on the aggravating factor; the rest were jury findings. Of the other two 
jury-conviction cases that were not bifurcated, one was a unified jury trial, the other involved a sentence 
agreed to by the defendant after the jury’s guilty verdict. There was only one case with an upward 
durational departure sentence that followed a bench trial conviction in Kansas. 
 214. In fifteen percent of jury-tried convictions there was a bench trial on the aggravating factor, 
while twenty percent had separate jury phases with separate evidence, instructions, or deliberations. 
Another twenty-nine percent had special verdicts on the aggravating factor which may or may not have 
been delivered after separate instructions and deliberation. See also MINN. DIST. JUDGES ASS’N 
COMM. ON CRIM. JURY INSTR. GUIDES, 10 MINNESOTA PRACTICE SERIES: MINNESOTA JURY 
INSTRUCTION GUIDES § 3.04 (6th ed. 2020) (“After you return your verdict, there may be additional 
issues for you to address and decide. I will instruct you further at that time.”). 
 215. Oregon’s cases with upward-departure sentences included an estimated seventy-eight jury 
trials and forty-two bench trials during the two-year period examined. 
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the jury to determine the aggravating fact.216 In sum, the bifurcated jury 
proceedings for upward departures predicted after Blakely have become a 
regular feature of these presumptive-guidelines systems, but only for the small 
set of defendants who opt for a jury trial and insist on contesting the aggravating 
fact before a jury as well. 
D. Remand and Retrial of Aggravating Factors 
There are two additional differences between current practice in these 
states and the procedure that would apply if aggravating factors triggering 
upward-departure sentences were considered elements for all purposes. Those 
differences concern the retrial of aggravating facts or allegations of new 
aggravating facts after remand. 
Ordinarily, an appellate court that finds a sentencing error could simply 
remand for resentencing, and the trial court need not retry the underlying 
conviction. In these five states, courts continue to order retrial of the 
aggravating fact alone, treating that fact as a sentencing factor.217 Yet, this 
procedure would not be allowed if these range-raising factors were truly 
elements, as the U.S. Supreme Court has suggested.218 
Assume, for example, that a defendant convicted of armed robbery appeals 
their conviction, alleging a procedural error regarding the “armed” element that 
separates the lesser offense of robbery from the greater offense of armed 
robbery, based on a bad jury instruction or evidentiary error. Upon finding a 
procedural error regarding that element, an appellate court would have three 
options. It could (1) find the error was harmless,219 (2) remand for the trial court 
to order resentencing on the lesser offense without that aggravating element, or 
(3) remand the case for retrial of the entire offense (armed robbery). Allowing 
the prosecutor a second bite at just the “armed” element while preventing the 
defendant from contesting the other elements would not be an option. Retrying 
the aggravating element alone would deprive the defendant of their right to a 
general verdict.220 And it would violate the defendant’s double jeopardy rights 
to retry all the elements but instruct the jury to find the elements other than 
the weapon element as established by the prior trial, thus directing a verdict of 
guilty on those elements.221 The same limitations should apply if states actually 
 
 216. See supra notes 214–15 and accompanying text. 
 217. See, e.g., State v. Jones, 745 N.W.2d 845, 851 (Minn. 2008). 
 218. See supra notes 28, 63–64 and accompanying text.  
 219. See, e.g., Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 4 (1999) (holding that a judge’s failure to instruct 
the jury on an element can be harmless error). 
 220. LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 13, § 26.4(i) & nn.260–264.50 (collecting authority). 
 221. Id.; see also id. § 17.4(a) (collecting authority); Simpson v. Florida, 403 U.S. 384, 386 (1971) 
(“[H]ad the second trial never occurred, the prosecutor could not, while trying the case under review, 
have laid the first jury verdict before the trial judge and demanded an instruction to the jury that, as a 
matter of law, petitioner was one of the armed robbers in the store that night.”); State v. Stiefel, 256 
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treated the aggravating factor separating the presumptive punishment from a 
departure punishment as an element of the offense. Instead, these states appear 
to assume this fact that raises the sentencing range is just a sentencing factor. 
Similarly, treating an aggravating factor as an element would jeopardize 
several state court decisions holding that a prosecutor’s decision to add an 
upward-departure allegation after remand is not the same as a prosecutor’s 
decision to add a higher charge.222 In Blackledge v. Perry,223 the Supreme Court 
held that adding a higher charge after remand raises a presumption of 
vindictiveness, in violation of due process.224 If the aggravating factor was truly 
an element of a greater offense, prosecutors who respond to a successful appeal 
by seeking an upward departure on remand would have to comply with the same 
due process restrictions they would face if they responded by raising the 
charge.225 
*    *    * 
This part turned from negotiated dispositions to contested cases and 
focused on the differences between procedures used to adjudicate ordinary-
offense elements and procedures these five states use to adjudicate aggravating 
factors for upward-departure sentences. By continuing to treat factfinding for 
upward departures as a matter of sentencing and not guilt, prosecutors in at 
least some of the states examined here benefit from several procedural shortcuts 
unavailable for adjudicating ordinary offense elements. These shortcuts include 
omitting allegations of facts needed for the higher sentence from the charging 
instrument, avoiding screening those allegations for probable cause at a 
preliminary hearing or indictment, reducing the formality of and separating 
waivers of trial, reserving a second chance to prove the facts for an aggravated 
sentence on remand without retrying the other elements of the offense, and 
 
So. 2d 581, 585 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972) (holding that such a procedure “would be impermissible, of 
course, under due process considerations which assure an accused a jury trial on all issues relating to 
each element of a given criminal charge”). For example, take the case State v. Davis, 335 P.3d 1266 
(Or. Ct. App. 2014), which held that the State’s issue preclusion instruction removed an element from 
the jury’s consideration in violation of defendant’s right to a jury trial when, after remand, the jury was 
told “[b]oth sides have had full and fair opportunity to litigate whether or not the defendant was the 
driver. And the jury made the determination, they did their work just like you. And so we must accept 
the fact that the defendant is the driver when we evaluate this case.” Id. at 1275. 
 222. See State v. Brown, 440 P.3d 962, 971 (Wash. 2019) (“Unlike cases where the prosecution 
chooses to add charges after a defendant exercises his right of appeal and succeeds, this case involves a 
sentencing recommendation . . . . [W]e decline to extend the Blackledge presumption in this context.”); 
see also State v. Sierra, 399 P.3d 987, 990 (Or. 2017) (rejecting Due Process Clause and Double 
Jeopardy Clause challenges when the State alleged after remand, and the jury found, four significant 
enhancement factors that had not been alleged or found during the original trial). 
 223. 417 U.S. 21 (1974).  
 224. Id. at 28–29 (finding a presumption of vindictiveness upon the addition of a higher charge 
after the defendant’s first appeal). 
 225. See generally LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 13, § 13.5(a) (discussing vindictive charging). 
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adding more serious charges after a defendant’s successful appeal without 
certain constitutional limits.226 
It is possible that the Court’s future application of its Apprendi doctrine 
may rule out some of these practices, making it more costly to use upward-
departure sentences in presumptive-guidelines systems. If that happens, 
hopefully states will not substitute even heavier reliance upon criminal history 
to calibrate sentences, as Kansas has done.227 Because courts presently exempt 
the fact of prior conviction from Blakely’s protections, such a move may be 
tempting. However, as Professors Richard Frase and Julian Roberts have 
documented, even if using criminal history is a cheap and easy option for 
parsing penalties in the short run, research reveals that it could exacerbate racial 
disparities and undermine crime-reduction efforts in the long run.228 
CONCLUSION 
This study of how presumptive-guidelines states have handled compliance 
with Blakely revealed several surprising practices. Some are at odds with 
theoretical explanations for presumptive sentencing guidelines,229 and others 
are inconsistent with the U.S. Supreme Court’s characterization of range-
raising facts as elements.230 But it is important not to leap to conclusions about 
the relative value of presumptive guidelines compared to other sentencing 
systems based on these limited findings. A concerning practice that is common 
under presumptive sentencing guidelines (say, plea agreements that trade a 
higher sentence for a lesser, less accurate, charge) may be even more prevalent 
in states without presumptive sentencing guidelines. It is also possible that any 
costs or concerns raised by the way states process cases with upward-departure 
sentences231 are outweighed by the potential benefits of presumptive 
sentencing, particularly if research demonstrates that presumptive sentencing 
 
 226. The second-class status of aggravating facts arguably has one potential benefit for the 
defendant, too: judges may be more open to bifurcating trials when evidence of the aggravating fact 
would not normally be part of the proof of other elements, allowing a defendant to seek a jury verdict 
on other elements before exposing jurors to aggravating factors that may otherwise create prejudice. 
 227. See KANSAS 2018 MANUAL, supra note 43, at 27–35 (listing sentence enhancements based on 
criminal history); see also Baron-Evans & Stith, supra note 30, at 1715 (describing proposal to permit 
upward departures based on criminal history but not on other grounds). 
 228. FRASE & ROBERTS, supra note 30, at 77–83, 133–51 (collecting research on the lack of crime 
reduction and the disproportionate impact on minority defendants). 
 229. See supra Section III.A.  
 230. See supra Part IV. 
 231. The study was limited to the relatively small fraction of cases with upward-departure 
sentences; downward departures are much more common. See Richard S. Frase & Kelly Lyn Mitchell, 
Why Are Minnesota’s Prison Populations Continuing To Rise in an Era of Decarceration?, 30 FED. SENT’G 
REP. 114, 117 (2017) (noting between 2011 and 2015 nine times as many downward as upward durational 
departures in Minnesota); STATE OF WASH. CASELOAD FORECAST COUNCIL, STATISTICAL 
SUMMARY OF ADULT FELONY SENTENCING: FISCAL YEAR 2017, at ix (2018) (showing that 23% of 
exceptional sentences increased the term of confinement above the range; 60.3% reduced below). 
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guidelines can help a state implement alternative responses to crime, shrink 
racial inequality, and reduce overreliance on criminal history, incarceration, and 
counterproductive terms and conditions of community release. 
With those caveats in mind, the findings suggest three potentially useful 
lessons. First, the power to seek or promise not to seek upward departures in 
these presumptive-guidelines systems enhances prosecutorial power to 
manipulate punishment and secure plea agreements. At least when judges lack 
the tools, authority, or incentive to disrupt stipulated agreements, prosecutors 
control not only the charge, but also whether a defendant will receive an 
upward-departure sentence for that charge if convicted. With no need to limit 
upward departures to cases a judge would agree warrant exceptionally severe 
penalties, upward departures are available for routine use in bargaining—sought 
with the expectation that they will be dropped as part of a deal, handy whenever 
defendants prefer incarceration to probation, traded for lesser or different 
charges, or layered with downward departures to reach an outcome both sides 
can live with.232 This Article is not the place to tackle the regulation of charging 
and sentencing bargaining—others, including the drafters of the MPCS, have 
tried.233 It is enough to note that the findings illustrate how plea bargaining, the 
black hole that consumes and exploits almost every effort to regulate 
punishment, has absorbed upward departures in these presumptive-guidelines 
states. 
The findings here also reinforce the need to be careful about what 
sentencing information means, especially in presumptive-guidelines 
jurisdictions where sentencing data often directs policy decisions. When all but 
a small percentage of convictions and sentences are the product of negotiation, 
and neither trial nor appellate judges enforce factual-basis requirements or 
question stipulations,234 those convictions and sentences lose reliability as 
records of fact. At most, they mark the charge and sentence factors that the 
prosecutor and the defendant would agree to. An upward-departure sentence 
 
 232. See supra Section III.A. 
 233. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENT’G 25–26 (AM. L. INST., forthcoming 2021) (on file with author) 
(listing provisions that would regulate deferred-prosecution agreements, authorize deferred 
adjudication without a prosecutor’s agreement, provide that deferred adjudication “not be conditioned 
on a guilty plea,” allow a court to consider offenders’ “substantial assistance” to the government as a 
mitigating factor at sentencing without government agreement, invalidate certain waivers of appeal, 
provide appellate relief for disproportionately severe sentences, ban the use of acquitted conduct, and 
more). Washington, for example, tried optional prosecutorial guidelines, which, unsurprisingly, many 
local offices have opted not to follow. See WASH. COMM’N, 2019 REVIEW, supra note 30, at 11 
(reporting these guidelines “are routinely followed in some prosecutor’s offices more than others” and 
mentioning an “[u]neven application of some enhancements, most of which are essentially mandatory 
minimums”); see also Ronald F. Wright, Sentencing Commissions as Provocateurs of Prosecutorial Self-
Regulation, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1010, 1022–25 (2005) (discussing attempts by sentencing commissions 
to regulate charging and bargaining). 
 234. See supra Section III.A. 
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does not reliably indicate an unusually severe offense or culpable offender. 
Rather, the prosecutor may have decided to seek a departure for a reason that 
has nothing to do with how serious the defendant’s crime or criminal record 
truly was. For example, a surge in the numbers of upward-departure sentences 
for attempted crimes does not demonstrate that the presumptive sentences for 
attempt are too low and need upward adjustment or that police have improved 
their ability to intercept crime before offenses have been completed. Instead, 
upward departures combined with substituting attempt for a completed crime 
may have been the easiest way for the parties to avoid a higher, perhaps 
mandatory minimum, sentence for the completed crime.235 
Finally, this project exposes how states with presumptive sentencing 
guidelines have navigated uncertainty about the scope of the Apprendi doctrine 
and resisted its expansion.236 Even before this past Term’s novel application of 
Apprendi to the revocation of release,237 multiple questions already divided these 
states. Do upward dispositional departures from probation or durational 
departures from a presumptive-probation term implicate the Blakely rule?238 
Which facts related to prior convictions, if any, are exempt under the exception 
for prior convictions?239 Is an aggravating factor authorizing a more severe range 
of punishment an “element” for purposes other than the right to a jury finding 
beyond a reasonable doubt, such as notice, waiver, or double jeopardy?240 Any 
jurisdiction that is considering presumptive sentencing guidelines must 
anticipate these constitutional issues, along with the many policy issues 
involved in designing a presumptive-guidelines system. 
  
 
 235. See supra notes 125–28 and accompanying text. 
 236. See supra Section II.C.1. 
 237. See United States v. Haymond, 139 S. Ct. 2369, 2379–80 (2019). See generally Kate Stith, 
Apprendi’s Two Constitutional Rights, 99 N.C. L. REV. 1299 (2021) (discussing Haymond). 
 238. See supra Section II.C.2. 
 239. See supra Section II.C.3. 
 240. See supra Part IV. 
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